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HOW WE LOST OUR MORAL RIGHTS AND THE DOOR CLOSED 
 ON NON-ECONOMIC VALUES IN COPYRIGHT
SUSAN P. LIEMER 
ABSTRACT 
The Visual Artists Rights Act (“VARA”) is a piece of modern legislation preceded by a rich history, with a 
significant gap.  As early as the 1400’s, patents were offered as economic incentive to develop new 
processes in the trades and applied arts.  By the 1700’s, the Statute of Anne became the first statute to 
protect the literary work of individual creators.  The Engravers’ Act of 1735 soon followed, expanding 
this protection to include the first works of visual art and providing the precursor to the modern right of 
integrity.  Millar v. Taylor was the landmark case that alluded to moral rights protection and found 
copyright existed at common law; however, it was replaced by statutory copyright in Donaldson v. 
Beckett.  From then on, only the statute could prescribe protection.  This effectively closed the door on 
moral rights protection in the United States, because the Donaldson interpretation provided the 
groundwork for interpretation of the first United States copyright statute.  Until VARA, the United 
States copyright law focused on economic protection, disregarding most other values.  This article traces 
moral rights through the early intellectual property law history, discusses the importance of the rights 
granted, and argues that VARA is most useful if jurists and legislators become aware of the history and 
the legislation itself. 
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 HOW WE LOST OUR MORAL RIGHTS AND THE DOOR CLOSED 
 ON NON-ECONOMIC VALUES IN COPYRIGHT 
SUSAN P. LIEMER∗
INTRODUCTION 
In 1997, a sculptor named Jan Martin won a lawsuit against the City of 
Indianapolis1 using a little-known federal statute called the Visual Artists Rights Act 
(“VARA”).2  The court found the City violated certain rights that the statute granted to 
Mr. Martin,3 when bulldozers destroyed his sculpture4 in the name of urban 
development.5  During the damages phase of the lawsuit, the court refused to award to 
Mr. Martin the enhanced damages available under the statute,6 because, after all, the 
City had been unaware of the statute.7  The Seventh Circuit had no problem affirming 
the District Court.8  How is it possible that ignorance of the law was a valid excuse? 
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∗Director of Lawyering Skills and Assistant Professor, Southern Illinois University School of Law; 
B.A., Princeton University; J.D., University of Virginia.  Thank you to all the participants of the Legal 
Writing Institute’s 2005 Writers Workshop, particularly Professors William Y. Chin, Susan Hanley 
Kosse, Sarah Ricks, and Louis J. Sirico.  Thank you also to Professors Laurel Wendt and James Duggan 
for expert library assistance. 
1 Martin v. City of Indianapolis, 982 F. Supp. 625 (S.D. Ind. 1997) [hereinafter Martin I]; 4 F. Supp. 
2d 808 (S.D. Ind. 1998) [hereinafter Martin II]; 28 F. Supp. 2d 1098 (S.D. Ind. 1998) [hereinafter Martin 
III], aff’d, 192 F.3d 608 (7th Cir. 1999) [hereinafter Martin IV]. 
2 Visual Artists Right Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5128 (1990) (codified at 17 U.S.C. 
§§  101, 106A, 107, 113, 301, 411, 412, 501, 506 (2000)). 
3 Martin I, 982 F. Supp. at 638 (“Martin has proved all five elements of his claim under VARA . . . 
.”).  The specific right at issue in Martin, the right of integrity, is described infra pp. 4–5.   
4 Martin I, 982 F. Supp. at 629 (“[O]n or about July 20, 1995, Symphony #1 was demolished by 
Jordan Demolition [Company].”). 
5 Id. at 628 (explaining the City acquired the land on which the sculpture stood “in accordance with 
its Urban Renewal Development Plan”). 
6 Martin II, 4 F. Supp. 2d at 811 (“Martin cannot recover enhanced statutory damages . . . for willful 
infringement.”).  Damages in VARA suits are the same as those for copyright infringement, found in 17 
U.S.C. §§ 504(c), 505 (2000).  A successful plaintiff may choose either actual or statutory damages. 17 
U.S.C. § 504(c)(1).  Statutory damages may range from $500 to $20,000, and if a violation is “willful,” the 
court may increase damages to a maximum of $100,000.  17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1), (2).  
7 Martin II, 4 F. Supp. 2d at 811 (“Martin has not produced evidence showing that the City had 
knowledge or reason to know that Martin’s interest . . . was protected . . . .”); Martin IV, 192 F.3d at 614 
(“As far as we can tell from the record, those VARA rights were unknown to the City.”).  In Mar in III, 
the court at least gave some more analytical reasoning, applying copyright requirements to moral rights 
damages, without citing any authority for doing so.  Mar in III, 28 F. Supp. 2d at 1102 (“the maxim 
‘ignorance of the law is no defense’ has no application in the realm of enhanced statutory damages for 
copyright infringement.”).   
8 Martin IV, 192 F.3d at 614. 
In spite of the City’s conduct resulting in the intentional destruction of the 
sculpture, we do not believe . . . , particularly given the fact that the issue of VARA 
ights had not been raised until this suit, that the City’s conduct was ‘willful’ . . . so as 
to entitle the plaintiff to enhanced damages. 
Id. (emphasis added).  Nonetheless, the court awarded Martin $131,252.55 in attorney’s fees 
and costs, Mar in III, 28 F. Supp. 2d at 1107, after stating that the statutory damages it did 
1 
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Answering this question requires taking a broad view of United States intellectual 
property law, including a look back at some details in its history.  While others have 
studied fully the history of Anglo-American copyright,9 the paucity of references in the 
histories to the type of rights granted by VARA is remarkable.  And so I have retraced 
that history, analyzing how the type of rights VARA provides fit into it. 
In Part I of this article, to provide the necessary background information, I explain 
briefly the rights granted by VARA.  Then in Part II, I look back at a time in history 
when intellectual property itself and Anglo-American intellectual property law concepts 
were first developing into their modern forms.  I argue that at that time the door was 
open to allow for the development of both non-economic interests, including those 
protected by VARA, and economic interests, such as those protected by copyright.  That 
was a time when both sets of interests seemed to sit more easily side-by-side and even 
intertwine in the minds and opinions of the common law judges.  Intellectual property 
law concepts were at an early evolutionary stage, and ideas that could evolve into both 
VARA rights and copyright swirled around in the same primordial soup of Anglo-
American intellectual property law.  There were many potential threads of intellectual 
property law developing at that time, and I focus my analysis specifically on how the 
potential for moral rights’ development was a part of that history. 
In Part III, I identify the specific moment when the door to that development closed, 
profoundly impacting the evolution of American intellectual property law for over 200 
years.  This historic turn of events so effectively cut off the development of an entire line 
of legal doctrine protecting non-economic intellectual property interests, that it was easy 
for a federal court in the 1990’s to excuse a defendant’s ignorance of its feeble re-
emergence.  And so I suggest in Part IV that judicial education about this history could 
make the federal judiciary more comfortable with VARA and its values and more adept 
at applying it well.  In addition, as a new evolution takes place in American intellectual 
property law today, and many different concepts swirl in the mix of laws that are 
considered and tried, there is an important opportunity to make sure moral rights are 
not lost again.  
I.  SO YOU’VE NEVER HEARD OF VARA? 
The law that the court excused the City of Indianapolis for not knowing was the 
Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, or VARA.10  It grants to an “author of a work of visual 
art”11 the rights of attribution and integrity.12  The term “author” is used here in the 
broad copyright sense of the word, to include an author or an artist.13  A “work of visual 
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award “[did] not cover the loss,” and that it was hoping to deter other municipalities from 
“wantonly destroying works of art.”  Martin II, 4 F. Supp. 2d at 812. 
9 See infra note 68. 
10 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2000). 
11 § 106A(a). 
12 Id. 
13 The copyright statute does not define “author,” only “works of authorship.”  17 U.S.C. § 102(a) 
(2000).  On the meaning of “author,” see Michael Birnhack, The D ad Sea Sc olls Case: Who Is An 
Author, 2001 E.I.P.R. 23(3), 128, 131–32 (discussing the definition of an “author”); James D.A. Boyle, 
The Search for An Author: Shakespea e and the Framers, 37 AM. U.L. REV. 625, 629–30 (1988) 
 
[5:1 2005] How We Lost Our Moral Rights 3 
art,” however, has a very narrow, specific definition: 
(1) a painting, drawing, print, or sculpture, existing in a single copy, in a 
limited edition of 200 copies or fewer that are signed and consecutively 
numbered by the author, or, in the case of a sculpture, in multiple cast, carved, 
or fabricated sculptures of 200 or fewer that are consecutively numbered by the 
author and bear the signature or other identifying mark of the author; or 
(2) a still photographic image produced for exhibition purposes only, 
existing in a single copy that is signed by the author, or in a limited edition of 
200 copies or fewer that are signed and consecutively numbered by the 
author.14
So the types of visual art for which VARA gives protection are what were 
traditionally known as the “fine arts,”15 i.e., painting, sculpture, art prints, and, more 
recently, art photography.  These works of art are one-of-a-kind or very limited edition 
pieces, valued for their uniqueness.16
The law also limits the meaning of a “work of visual art” by clarifying what it is not: 
A work of visual art does not include— 
(A)(i) any poster, map, globe, chart, technical drawing, diagram, model,17 
applied art, motion picture or other audiovisual work, book, magazine, 
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(analyzing how “the author is different than other workers”); Sharon Connelly, Authorship, Ownersh p
and Control: Balancing the Economic and Arti tic Issues Ra sed by the Martha Graham Copyright Case, 
15 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 837, 839, 863–64 (2005); Jane C. Ginsburg, The Concept 
o  Autho ship in Comparative Copyr ght Law, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 1063, 1072–74 (2003) [hereinafter 
Ginsburg, Autho ship in Comparative Copyr ght]; Marci A. Hamilton, Copyright a  the Supreme Court: 
A Jurisprudence of Deference, 47 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 317, 326 (2000) [hereinafter Hamilton, 
Deference] (arguing the Supreme Court has rejected “an author-centered vision of the copyright law”); 
Peter Jaszi, Towards a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphosi  of “Authorship,” 1991 DUKE L.J. 455, 
468–71 (1991) (examining how the law received concepts of authorship from its cultural context); 
Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, “Author-Stories:”  Narrative’s Implica ons for Mora  Rights and Copyright’s 
Joint Authorship Doctrine, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 4 (2001) [hereinafter Kwall, “Author-Stories”] (“[T]he 
author’s voice is one that has been submerged in the development of copyright law . . . .”); David 
Nimmer, Copyright in the Dead Sea Sc olls: Authorship and Originality, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 7–13 
(2001).  
14 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000). 
15 See Christine Haight Farley, Judging Art, 79 TUL. L. REV. 805, 839 n.140 (2005) (asserting “art is 
oppositionally defined in law and elsewhere with binary notions such as high art versus low art, art 
versus craft, art versus entertainment, and fine art versus popular art”); Pete Singer, The Three Stooges 
Latest Act: Attempting to Define the Scope of Protection the First Amendment P v d  to Wo k  o  A  
D pic ing Celebrities, 27 DAYTON L. REV. 313, 330–31 (2002) (listing qualities of fine art, as opposed to 
popular art, which the California Supreme Court examined). 
16 See Uni ed Sta es v. Int’l Harvester Co., 23 C.C.P.A. 55, 59 (1935)  (considering trial testimony 
asserting that “Fine arts is something that is determined very often by the scarcity of the subject, or the 
future appreciation of it.”); Christopher J. Robinson, The “Recognized Sta ure” Standard in the Vi ua  
Artists Rights Act, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1935, 1936 (2000) (“Fine art is unique among the arts in one 
important sense.  A disproportionate percentage of the value of a work of fine art is in the physical object 
created, rather than the exploitation of derivatives or copies.”). 
17 But see Flack v. Friends of Queen Catherine Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d 526, 533 (2001) (finding clay 
model for bronze sculpture was a work of visual art in its own right).  
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newspaper, periodical, data base, electronic information service, electronic 
publication, or similar publication; 
(ii) any merchandising item or advertising, promotional, descriptive, 
covering, or packaging material or container; . . . .18
This negative definition prevents VARA from protecting purely commercial or mass-
produced works.19
Thus, VARA applies to the creators of paintings, sculptures, limited edition prints, 
and exhibition photographs.20  The City of Indianapolis apparently did not know there 
was a special law for sculptors and their ilk before it sent in the bulldozers.  
What VARA grants to these creators are the right of attribution21 and the right of 
integrity.22  The right of attribution allows an artist to put his name on his own work23 
and to prevent his name from being put someone else’s work.24  The right of attribution 
also allows an artist to prevent the use of his name on his work if the work has been 
modified or distorted in a way that would be “prejudicial to his or her honor or 
reputation.”25  Thus, VARA allows the artist to maintain control over which works will be 
 attributed to him and which will not, giving him some control over his reputation as an 
artist.26  
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18 17 U.S.C. § 101.  
19 See Silberman v. Innovation Luggage, Inc., 2003 WL 1787123, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2003) 
(“[T]here is no indication that in passing VARA Congress meant to penalize purchasers of mass-produced 
posters who treated them with less than the respect due to original works of art.”). 
20 Cf. Kwall, “Author-Stories,” supra note 13, at 30 (arguing that “[b]y limiting its protections to 
only certain categories of visual art, VARA . . . privileges the voices of certain authors over others”); 
Sheldon W. Halpern, Of Moral Right and Moral Righteousness, 1 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 65, 80 
(1997) (asserting VARA conflicts with the egalitarian tradition of copyright law). 
21 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(1), (2) (2000). 
22 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3). 
23 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(1)(a) (“[T]he author of a work of visual art—shall have the right—to claim 
authorship of that work . . . .”); see also Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, The Attribution Right in the United 
Sta es: Caught in the Cros fire Between C py igh  and S ion 43(a), 377 WASH. L. REV. 985, 995 (2002) 
[hereinafter Kwall, Attribution] (“The objective of the right of attribution is to insure that the creator of 
a work receives recognition as the author.”). 
24 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(1)(b) (“[T]he author of a work of visual art—shall have the right—. . . to 
prevent the use of his or her name as the author of any work of visual art which he or she did not 
create.”); ee al o Kwall, Attribution, supra note 23, at 985 (“[P]eople should not receive attribution for 
something that is not their creation.”). 
25 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(2). 
26 See Kwall, Attribution, supra note 23, at 994 (“[F]or many creators, some qualities, such as 
professional reputation and artistic dignity, are more important than money . . . .”); Susan P. Liemer, 
Understanding Artists’ Moral Rights: A Primer, 7 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 41, 47–49 (1998) [hereinafter 
Liemer, Primer].  But see Kwall, “Author-Stories,” supra note 13, at 25 (distinguishing between an 
author’s dignity and an author’s reputation).   
On securing reputation protection via trademark law, see Jane C. Ginsburg, The Author’s Name as 
a Trademark:  A Perverse Perspective on the Moral Right of Paterni y?, 23 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 
379 (2005); Randolph Stuart Sergent, Building Reputational Capital: The Right of Attribution Under 
Section 43 of the Lanham Act, 19 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 45 (1994–95). 
On the recent abridgement of the right of attribution outside the scope of VARA, in Dastar Corp v. 
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003), see Marshall Leaffer, Life After Eldred: The 
Supreme Court and the Future of Copyright, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1597, 1613–15 (2004); Tyler T. 
Ochoa, Rights of Attribution, Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, and the Copyright Public Domain, 24 
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Likewise, the right of integrity allows an artist to prevent someone else from 
modifying his work without permission,27 again if it would “be prejudicial to his or her 
honor or reputation.”28  And the right of integrity allows an artist to prevent outright 
destruction of the work,29 provided it is a work of “recognized stature.”30  In this way, 
VARA allows the artist to maintain aesthetic control of the physical work, which in turn 
gives him some additional control over his reputation as an artist.31  It was ignorance of 
this last right enumerated in the statute, an artist’s right to prevent destruction of his 
art, for which the Seventh Circuit was quick to excuse the City of Indianapolis. 
Note that VARA grants these rights to artists, and these rights are personal to the 
individual artist,32 lasting for a lifetime.33  These rights do not follow the ownership of 
the physical work of art, nor do they follow the ownership of the copyright.34  Both the 
artwork and the copyright can be held in other hands; the right of attribution and the 
right of integrity will still lie with the artist.35
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WHITTIER L. REV. 911, 926 (2003). 
27 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(a) (2000); ee Thomas P. Heide, The Moral Right of Integrity and the 
Global Information Infrastructure: Time fo  a New Approach?, 2 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 211, 229–
51 (1996) (providing an overview of the right of integrity in the United States, United Kingdom, 
Germany, and France). 
28  17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(a). 
29  17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(b). But see Cort v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Cos., 311 F.3d 979, 986 
(2002) (finding a mural covered with white sealant was not destroyed, “it simply disappeared”); English 
v. BFC & R E. 11th Street LLC, 1997 WL 746444, at *16 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding total obstruction of 
murals that does not touch them neither modifies nor destroys them).  Traditionally, the right of 
integrity in other countries did not protect against destruction, only modification.  LaCasse et Welcome 
c. Abbe Quenard, CA Paris, 1934 D.P.II 385; Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77, 81–82 (2d Cir. 
1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1824 (1996) (“Destruction is seen as less harmful than the continued 
display of deformed or mutilated work that misrepresents the artist . . . .”). 
30 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(b); Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 861 F. Supp. 303, 325 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) 
(“[T]he recognized stature requirement is best viewed as a gate-keeping mechanism—protection is 
afforded only to those works of art that art experts, the art community, or society in general views as 
possessing stature.”), aff’d in part, vacated in part, rev’d in part, 71 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 1995); Martin IV, 
192 F.3d at 612  (“‘Recognized stature’ is a necessary finding under VARA in order to protect a work of 
visual art from destruction.”); Pollara v. Seymour, 206 F. Supp. 2d 333, 337 (2002) (finding no recognized 
stature for hand-painted portable mural used as backdrop to exhibit booth, because artist had no 
intention to preserve it for later display); see al  Robinson, supra note 16, at 1963–66 (arguing the 
recognized stature requirement should be dropped). 
31 See Liemer, Primer, supra note 26, at 50–52. 
32 17 U.S.C. § 106A(b) (“Only the author of a work of visual art has the rights conferred by 
subsection (a) in that work . . . .”); see also Justin Hughes, The Personality Interes  of Artis s and 
Invento s in Intelle tual Property, 16 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 81, 114 (1998) (suggesting art may be a 
surrogate of the artist’s self); Kwall, “Author-Stories,” supra note 13, at 23 (stating “this doctrine is 
concerned with protecting the author’s personal dignity and the human spirit reflected in her artistic 
creations.”).  See generally Burton Ong, Why Mo al Rights Matte : Re ognizing the Intrinsic Value o  
Integrity Rights, 26 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 297, 298–99 (2003) (analyzing both intrinsic and instrumental 
values behind moral rights). 
33 17 U.S.C. § 106A(d) (2000) (“[T]he rights conferred by subsection (a) shall endure for a term 
consisting of the life of the author.”). 
34 17 U.S.C. § 106A(b) (granting the right of attribution and integrity “whether or not the author is 
the copyright owner”). 
35  See Robinson, supra note 16, at 1939 (explaining these rights “acknowledge that an artist has 
. . . a creative persona that is injected into the work of art at creation and which remains a part of the 
work despite his physical relinquishment of the object to others”); Shaw v. Rizzoli Int’l Publ’ns, Inc., 1999 
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Congress passed VARA in 1990.  Fifteen years have come and gone, and only about 
as many cases have been decided under this federal statute.  Artists themselves often do 
not know about this law,36 waive their rights,37 or find it too costly to assert their rights 
in federal court.38  Most VARA plaintiffs have lost in court, which may further discourage 
others from filing lawsuits under VARA.39   
Congress passed VARA to help United States law comply with the Berne 
Convention.40  This intellectual property treaty was over one hundred years old and had 
over one hundred other signatories before the United States signed it.41  The Berne 
Convention does require signatory nations to grant artists the right of attribution and 
the right of integrity.42  Despite VARA, the sufficiency of United States compliance with 
the Berne Convention is at least questionable.43
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WL 160084, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (stating “economic harm is not the type of injury protected by VARA”). 
36 See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, WAIVER OF MORAL RIGHTS IN VISUAL 
ARTWORK, (Oct. 24, 1996), http://www.copyright.gov/reports/exsum.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2005) 
(acknowledging “the low level of VARA awareness”); RayMing Chang, Revisiting the Visual Artists 
Rights Act o  1990: A Follow-up Survey About Awareness and Waiver, 13 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 129, 
144 (2005) (reporting little change in artists’ awareness of VARA between 1995 and 2003). 
37 Id. (reporting 40% of over 1,000 artists answering a written survey “said waiver clauses were 
part of contracts for commissioned works”); Chang, supra note 36, at 144–45 (reporting a small increase 
in artists’ awareness of VARA waivers from 1995 to 2003).  
38 Id. (reporting “[s]everal comments remarked that the law was unenforceable, largely because 
enforcement is too costly”).  
39 The statute has, however, generated much scholarship.  See Robinson, supra note 16, at 1939 
n.22 (“Moral rights . . . are a favorite of academics, and articles on the subject far outnumber the cases in 
which moral rights are invoked.”).   
40 Compare Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, 
revised July 24, 1971, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Berne Convention], and Berne Convention 
Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (1988), with Visual Artists Right Act of 
1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5128 (1990) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106A, 107, 113, 301, 411, 
412, 501, 506 (2000)). 
As I wrote previously, “[t]he impetus . . . to join the Berne Convention has been explained in terms 
of ensuring protection of American artists, particularly writers, in the global marketplace . . . as well as 
sustained efforts by interested members of the arts community.”  Liemer, Primer, supra note 26, at 46 
n.34 (citing Robert J. Sherman, The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990: American Artists Burn d Again, 
17 CARDOZO L. REV. 373, 374 n.11, 398–401 (1995); Edward J. Damich, Mora  Rights Protection and 
Resale Royalties fo  Visual Art in the United State : Development and Current Status, 12 CARDOZO 
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 387, 407 (1994)); ee also Cambra E. Stern, A Matter of Life or Dea h: The Vi ua  
Artists Rights Act and the Problem of Postmo em Mo al Rights, 51 UCLA L. REV. 849, 857 (2004) 
(explaining the impetus to join the Berne Convention was the United States’ “copyright-based 
industries” wanting more protection for their products in international markets).  
41 United States Department of State, Office of the Legal Adviser, Treaty Affairs, Treaties in Force, 
357–58, Jan. 1, 2000, http://www.state.gov/www/global/legal_affairs/tif_01d.pdf. 
42 Berne Convention, supra note 40, at Art. 6 bis, 1. 
Independently of the author’s economic rights, and even after the transfer of 
said rights, the author shall have the right to claim authorship of the work and to 
object to any distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or other derogatory action 
in relation to, the said work, which would be prejudicial to his honor or reputation. 
Id. 
43 See William Belanger, U.S. Compliance with the Berne Convention, 3 GEO. MASON L. REV. 373, 
398–401 (1995); Janet Fries & Michael J. Remington, Bewa e o  Mutant Copyright: Justic  Scalia Issues 
a Warning in the Dastar Decision, IP L. & BUS., Sept. 2003, at 70; Kwall, Attribution, supra note 23, at 
1025 (“our legal system has failed to protect the attribution interest in an independent, and doctrinally 
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When Congress debated the adoption of VARA,44 media attention focused on Ted 
Turner’s efforts to ensure he could add color to the old, black and white films in his 
collection.45  When the VARA bill passed, it was tacked onto a lengthy bill authorizing 
eighty-five new federal judges and other court reform.46  Upon codification, it simply was 
inserted between existing, unrelated sections of the federal copyright law.47  The court in 
Martin v. City of Indianapolis referred to VARA as “a stepchild of our copyright laws 
. . . .”48
And so, it is not surprising that a defendant in a VARA lawsuit might not have 
heard, before reading the Complaint, about this statute and the special rights it grants to 
creators of visual art.  It remains surprising, however, that a defendant could argue 
successfully in a federal Court of Appeals that ignorance of this law was sufficient to 
excuse statutorily-prescribed damages. 
The Anglophone world generally refers to VARA rights as artists’ “moral rights,” 
translating loosely from the French term droit moral.49  “In this context, ‘moral’ is not the 
opposite of immoral or even amoral.  The term simply conveys an element of ethics or 
societal interest.”50  In addition to the right of attribution (le droit à la paternité51) and 
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honest, manner”); Teresa Laky, Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.: Widening the Gap 
Between United States Intell ctual Property Law and Berne Convention Requ ements, 14 SETON HALL 
J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 441 (2004); Ochoa, supra note 26, at 924–27 (doubting Dastar meets Berne 
Convention moral rights requirements); Ruth L. Okediji, Through the Years: The Supreme Court and 
the Copyright Clause, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1633, 1649–50 (2004) (referring to the United States’ 
“already weak compliance scheme for the protection of moral rights under the Berne Convention”); 
Leaffer, supra note 26, at 1615 (asserting even the United States’ minimalist compliance with Berne has 
recently been undermined); Natalie C. Suhl, Moral Rights Protection in the Uni ed Sta es Under the 
Berne Convention: A Fictional Work?, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1203 (2002); David 
S. Welkowitz, The Supreme Court and Trademark Law in the New Millennium, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. 
REV. 1659, 1696 n.209 (questioning “whether the United States is adhering to its obligations under the 
Berne Convention”). 
44 See Sherman, supra note 40, at 401–09 (providing an overview of VARA’s legislative history). 
45 See Janine V. McNally, Congressional Limits on Technological Alte ations to Film: The Public 
Interest and the Artists’ Moral Right, 5 HIGH TECH. L.J. 129 (1990); Don Shannon, Panel Weighs ‘Mo al 
Rights’ of Film Alteration, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 25, 1989, at 1 (reporting  Senate sub-committee hearings on 
moral rights).  For a French court’s perspective on adding color to black-and-white movies, see Huston c. 
La Cinq, Cass. 1e civ., May 28, 1991, J.C.P. 1991, II, 21731 (a French court enjoining the showing of Ted 
Turner’s colorized version of John Huston’s movie, the Asphalt Jungle). 
46 Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (1990); see a so Kwall, 
“Author-Stories,” supra note 13, at 27 n.112 (describing relevant party politics). 
47 The main provisions of VARA are in 17 U.S.C. § 106A, which was inserted between § 106 
(granting the traditional bundle of rights known as copyright: the exclusive right to reproduce, 
distribute, perform, display, and make derivative works from a copyrighted work) and § 107 (codifying 
the long-standing fair use exception). 
48 Martin IV, 192 F.3d at 611; ee a o Cort, 311 F.3d at 985 (stating “American law has resisted 
recognizing moral rights”). 
49 See Russell J. DaSilva, Droit Mora  and the Amoral Copyright: A Comparison of Artists’ Rights 
in France and the United States, 28 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 1, 2 n.7 (1980) (citing Dominique 
Giocanti, Moral Rights: Authors’ Protection and Bus ness Needs, 10 J. INT’L L. & ECON. 627, 627 n.1 
(1975)).  France has long been considered the leader in this area of the law.  Id.; Sherman, supra note 40, 
at 389 n.92; Benjamin Davidson, Lost in Translation: Distinguishing Between French and Anglo
Ame ican Natural Rights in Literary Property, and H w Dastar Prove  That the Difference Still 
Matters, 38 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 583 (2005).  
50 See Liemer, Primer, supra note 26, at 42 (citing RANDOM HOUSE UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1249 
 
[5:1 2005] The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law 8 
the right of integrity (le droit au respect de l’ouevre52), which are the most commonly 
recognized moral rights, some countries recognize the right of disclosure53 (le droit de 
divulgation54), the right of withdrawal55 (le droit de retrait ou de repentir56), and resale 
royalty rights57 (le droit de suite58).  There are many other ways in which moral rights 
are more expansive  in other countries, including the duration,59 a lack of waivers,60 the 
types of work protected,61 and applicability to works for hire,62 i.e., works made for an 
employer.63
So the question remains, if artists’ moral rights are well-established, mainstream 
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(2d ed. 1993) (defining “moral” as “of, pertaining to, or concerned with the principle or rules of right 
conduct . . . ethical”); Rebecca J. Morton, Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc.: A Fair Test o  the Visual Artists 
Rights Act?, 28 CONN. L. REV. 875, 912 (1996) (“Traditional moral rights theory . . . ‘presupposes a broad 
societal interest in the creation of fine art.’” (citation omitted)); Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Copyright and 
he Mo al Righ : I  an American Mar iage Possible?, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1, 3 n.6 (1985) [hereinafter Kwall, 
Marriage]. 
51 See, e.g., Law No. 57-298 of Mar. 11, 1957, J.O., Mar. 14, 1957, 2723 B.L.D. 197, art. 6 (France) 
[hereinafter Law No. 57-298]. The French term used to be translated directly into English as “the right 
of paternity,” but the gender-neutral term “right of attribution” is now used more frequently.  The 
French term may, however, more closely capture the nature of the relationship between art and artist.  
See Liemer, Primer, supra note 26, at 43, n.15 (comparing artist’s view of harm to his art to harm to a 
loved one). 
52 See, e.g., Law No. 57-298, art. 6.  
53 See Liemer, Primer, supra note 26, at 52–54. 
54 See, e.g., Law No. 57-298, art. 56.  See infra p. 25, on the similarity between Anglo-American 
copyright law’s right to decide when to publish and the French droit de divulgation; see also Heide, supra 
note 27, at 245–52 (examining the French droit de divulgation). 
55 See generally Liemer, Primer, supra note 26, at 54–55; 
56 See, e.g., Law No. 57-298, art. 32. 
57 See generally LILIANE DE PIERREDON-FAWCETT, THE DROIT DE SUITE IN LITERARY AND ARTISTIC 
PROPERTY, A COMPARATIVE STUDY (1991); Liemer, Primer, supra note 26, at 55–56; Michael B. Reddy, 
The Droit de Sui e: Why Ameri an Fine Arti s Should Have the Right to a Resale Royal y, 15 LOY. L.A. 
ENT. L. REV. 509 (1995). 
58 See, e.g., California Art Preservation Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 987 (2005); Law No. 57-298, art. 42. 
59 In France, for example, moral rights are perpetual.  Law No. 57-298, art. 6.  Heirs are assumed to 
be carrying out the wishes of the artist, not imposing their own decisions.  See RALPH E. LERNER & 
JUDITH BRESSLER, ART LAW: THE GUIDE FOR COLLECTORS, INVESTORS, DEALERS, AND ARTISTS 948 (2d 
ed. 1998); see also Stern, supra note 40, at 868–69 (analyzing current problems arising from differing 
durations for moral rights in federal and state legislation in the United States). 
60 For example, moral rights are not waivable in France, Law No. 57-298, art. 6, or in Germany, 
Law of Sept. 9, 1965, v. 4.7.1965 (BGB1. I S.2098). 
61 See, e.g., Soc. Le Chant de Monde c. Soc. Fox Europe et Soc. Fox Americaine Twentieth Century, 
CA Paris, Jan. 13, 1953, Gaz. Pal. 1953, 2, pan. jurispr., 191 (France) (granting moral rights protection to 
classical music composer Shostakovich). 
62 By definition in the United States, a “work for hire” is not a “work of visual art,” 17 U.S.C. § 101, 
and so it is not protected by VARA.  See Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77, 85–89 (2d Cir. 1995), 
cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1824 (1996) (analyzing “work for hire” in a VARA context); Martin I, 982 F. Supp. 
625 at 36 (also analyzing “work for hire” in a VARA context); Marina Santilla, Uni ed Sta es’ Mora  
Rights Developments in European Perspective, 1 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 89, 99 (1997) (reviewing 
effect of no work for hire doctrine on European moral rights). 
63 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining a work for hire as “a work prepared by an employee within the scope of 
his or her employment”); ee al o Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 740–41 
(1989) (defining “scope of employment” for artists by applying the common law of agency). 
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law in some other countries,64 why is VARA so tenuous in the United States as to make  
a federal court reluctant to apply it?  How did we lose our moral rights?  Did we ever 
have them to begin with? 
II.  MORAL RIGHTS’ ANCESTOR STOOD ON AN EARLIER EVOLUTIONARY BRANCH OF THE 
LAW 
A.  Early Monopoly 
The story65 of intellectual property law66 in the common law countries generally 
starts in 1476,67 with the introduction of printing in England, by William Caxton.68  The 
King issued “letters of patent,” allowing monopolies for a fixed number of years, to 
individuals who could bring to England and develop new processes in the trades and 
applied arts.69  Printing was one of those trades. 
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64 See Cheryl Swack, Safeguarding Artistic Creation and the Cultural Heritage: A Comparison of 
Droit Moral Between France and the Uni ed Sta es, 22 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 361, 364 (1998) 
(“[M]oral rights in France and continental Europe have evolved to protect not only an artist’s personal 
right in the overall integrity of his work, but . . . have protected Europe’s cultural property.”); SIVA 
VAIDHYANATHAN, COPYRIGHTS AND COPYWRONGS, THE RISE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND HOW IT 
THREATENS CREATIVITY 26 (2001) (asserting “European nations have consistently granted a higher level 
of protection to authors and artists than American laws have”). 
65 On the use of narratives to help the judiciary broaden its perspective on moral rights in our 
intellectual property law, see generally Kwall, “Author-Stories,” supra note 13.  
66 On the broader, contemporaneous development of visual artists as individuals with interests 
distinct from those of their patrons, see Evelyn Lincoln, Invention and Authorship in Early Mode n
Italian Visual Culture, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 1093 (2003); Suhl, supra note 43, at 1206; Swack, supra note 
64, at 368–69 (crediting Michelangelo as the first artist with enough clout to demand creative control 
similar to artists’ moral rights).  And on the analogous development for writers, see MARK ROSE, 
AUTHORS AND OWNERS: THE INVENTION OF COPYRIGHT 16–20 (1993) [hereinafter ROSE, COPYRIGHT]. 
67 See Memorandum, 4 Burr. 2411, 2413-17, 98 Eng. Rep. 262, 264-266 (K.B. 1774) (providing a 
brief history of printing in England); Donaldson v. Beckett, 2 Bro. P.C. 129, 135, 1 Eng. Rep. 837, 840 
(H.L. 1774) (“In 1471, Caxton, a mercer of London, brought the art [of printing] into this kingdom.”).  
68 For a traditional (and colorfully worded) history of English copyright law, see AUGUSTINE 
BIRRELL, THE LAW AND HISTORY OF COPYRIGHT IN BOOKS (1899).  For more recent versions, see inter 
alia, LYMAN RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (1968) (a more recently written 
version); HARRY RANSOM, THE FIRST COPYRIGHT STATUTE (1956); ROSE, COPYRIGHT, supra note 68.   
And for a comprehensive review of the relevant primary materials, critical of traditional accounts, see 
ROMAN DEAZLEY, ON THE ORIGIN OF THE RIGHT TO COPY: CHARTING THE MOVEMENT OF COPYRIGHT LAW 
IN THE EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY BRITAIN (1695–1775) (2004).  
69 See Memorandum, 4 Burr. at 2415, 98 Eng. Rep. at 265 (reporting on Caxton’s secretive 
acquisition of printing skills and their transmission to England); RANSOM, supra note 68, at 22 
(reporting inducements for European printers to move to England); see also Harry Hillman Chartrand, 
Copy ght C.P.U.: Creators, Proprietors, and Users, 30 J. ARTS MGMT., L. & SOC’Y 209, 212 (2000) (“[T]he 
year William Caxton introduced the printing press in England, . . . a licensing law requir[ed] printers to 
inscribe their name, location and titles of works they wanted to print on a register.  If approved for 
publication, the Crown granted a copye to the printer.  The rights flowing from this copye . . . were held 
by the printer . . . .”); Proceedings in the Lords on the Question of Literary Proper y (Feb. 4–22, 1774), in 
XVIII COBBETT’S PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND 950, 993–994 (1813) (De Grey, Lord C.J.) 
[hereinafter COBBETT’S PARL. HIST.], http://www.copyrighthistory.com/donaldson.html (last visited Nov. 
5, 2005) (“The manner in which the copy-right was held was a kind of copyhold tenure, in which the 
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In the book printing and selling business, the monopoly came to vest in the 
Stationers Company in London, the printers’ guild.70  Only members of the Stationers 
Company could print and sell books,71 and they were required to register each 
publication with the Company.72  Without the means of production,73 authors usually 
were forced to sell their manuscripts to members of the Company and forgo any direct 
future benefits.74  The Stationers received the economic benefits of a monopoly,75 and the 
government was able to control the market and exercise pre-publication censorship.76  
The Stationers also received some political protection because, by design, they were 
prevented from publishing material that might displease the regime and thus endanger 
themselves.77  By 1644, the poet John Milton was arguing publicly against the renewal of 
pre-publication censorship laws.78  Milton advocated on behalf of both authors79 and 
society,80 and challenged the booksellers’ motives.81
Although there was no explicit law at this time protecting moral rights (or economic 
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owner has a title by custom only, at the will and pleasure of the lord.”). 
70 See DEAZLEY, supra note 68, at 2 n.4 (stating the “relationship between the state and the 
Stationers began in 1557 when the Stationers’ Company received its charter from Philip and Mary, for 
the purpose of providing the monarchy with a method of controlling . . . printing”); RANSOM, supra note 
68, at 29 (stating Queen Mary chartered the Company as a means to regulate the press). 
71 See VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 64, at 37 (calling this arrangement “a sweet deal for the 
publishers”). 
72 There were two main exceptions to this monopoly: (1) the royal prerogative, by which the 
monarch directly controlled the printing of government documents, such as the laws and calendars, and 
(2) the copyrights held by Oxford and Cambridge Universities.  See BIRRELL, supra note 68, at 55, 143. 
73 See Chartrand, supra note 69, at 212 (explaining that booksellers owned a “capital-intensive and 
technically demanding piece of equipment,” there were many more authors than booksellers, and so 
booksellers easily controlled the marketplace). 
74 Id. (reporting the norm was “a single up-front payment extinguishing all future economic and/or 
moral claims of the [author] to the fruit of his or her efforts”). 
75 See BIRRELL, supra note 68, at 55 (describing “the printers or booksellers, who from the 
beginning of things were alert to make a little money out of their calling”); Chartrand, supra note 69, at 
216 (explaining “the stationers themselves steadfastly remained, what they had always been, eminently 
practical men; and they consistently protected their monopoly”); L. Ray Patterson, Copyright and “the 
Exclusive Right” of Authors, 1 J. INTELL. PROP. 1, 9 (1993) (stating “[t]he stationers . . . insisted on a quid 
pro quo”); RANSOM, supra note 68, at 10 (noting the Stationers Company’s “shrewd service to official 
regulation”).  
76 See Chartrand, supra note 69, at 213 (describing how the interests of the government and the 
booksellers coincided); DEAZLEY, supra note 68, at 2 (describing “a mutually beneficial association which 
provided the monarch and the government of the day with an effective means to monitor and censor the 
press, and the stationers with a statutory protection securing the reproduction of their copies.”); Kwall, 
“Author-Stories,” supra note 13, at 17 n.63 (“Licensing also facilitated government censorship.”).  The 
relationship continued to develop via a series of Star Chamber decrees, Interregnum ordinances, and a 
series of licensing acts.  See DEAZLEY, supra note 68, at 2 n.4; Chartrand, supra note 69, at 213–15; 
RANSOM, supra note 68, at 33–36, 61–62, 66–73. 
77 See BIRRELL, supra note 68, at 54 (reminding us that “to peddle new ideas in print has at all 
periods of man’s history exposed the pedler to pains and penalties of divers kinds”). 
78 JOHN MILTON, AEROPAGITICA, A Speech for the Liberty of Unlicensed Printing, To the 
Parliament of England (1644), eprinted in 32 GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 381 (1952).  
Milton himself flouted authority and published this speech as a pamphlet, without a license.  Id. at vi. 
79 Id. at 398 (arguing that censorship was “a dishonour and derogation to the author”). 
80 Id. at 399 (arguing that censorship disparaged the intelligence of the public). 
81 Id. at 412 (stating the booksellers acted “under pretence” and “with glosing colours” when 
supporting the licensing acts). 
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interests of authors, for that matter), in practice there was some protection for the 
integrity and accurate attribution of literary works.82  If the censors had approved a 
book, printing and selling a modified version of it would have had its risks.  Once a 
bookseller had the censors’ approval and an exclusive license to print a book, he had good 
reason to protect his investment and no economic incentive to incur further risk.83  Since 
this system discouraged modifications, the integrity of the works received some 
protection.  If works were not modified, then authors’ names would not be attached to 
works which were not actually quite what they had written.  Thus, licensing also would 
have protected the aspect of the right of attribution that prevents an author’s name from 
being on work he did not create.84
In addition to the effects of censorship and licensing, there may have been a type of 
“honor among thieves.”85  If each guild member respected the other members’ titles, his 
own titles would be protected in turn.  Misattribution or modification of a work would 
thwart the registration system upon which the monopoly relied, because then something 
other than the registered work86 would be competing in the marketplace.  To the extent 
this dynamic protected moral rights, the impetus was the protection of the economic 
value of the works registered to guild members, not protection of authors’ creativity. 
Indeed, the general displeasure of authors with lack of control over their own 
creations suggests that respect for moral rights within the guild was less than absolute.  
The writer Daniel Defoe complained publicly about “press piracy” and the lack of respect 
for authors’ interests.87  The philosopher John Locke expressed his frustration with 
booksellers who held copyrights in ancient works, stating they “claim the text to be 
theirs, and so will not suffer fairer or more correct editions than any they print here, or 
with new comments to be imported . . . .”88  Preventing competing versions of books in 
this context of censorship and absolute monopoly, with no works allowed into the public 
domain, created stasis in the available texts, not necessarily a good result for authors’ 
creativity or incomes. 
When the Licensing Act of 166289 expired in 1695, the convenient relationship 
between the monarchy and the printers came to an end.90  Locke had undertaken serious 
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82 See VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 64, at 37 (stating that authors “could be assured that their 
works would not be . . . misrepresented in the market”). 
83 But see RANSOM, supra note 68, at 70–71 (indicating there were many unregistered publications 
at this time). 
84 See 17 U.S.C. § 106A(1)(B) (2000) (granting an artist the right to prevent the use of his name on 
a work he did not create); 17 U.S.C. § 106A(2) (granting an artist the right to prevent the use of his name 
on a work “in the event of a distortion, mutilation, or other modification of the work”). 
85 See Chartrand, supra note 69, at 218 (referring to the “‘ethical’” practices of the guild concerning 
moral rights). 
86 See supra note 71. 
87 See DEAZLEY, supra note 68, at 31–32. 
88 John Locke, A Letter from Locke to Clarke, Oates, Jan. 2 (1692–93), reprinted in Hideaki  
Shirata, The Origin of Two American Copyright Theorie : A Case of the Re ption of Engli h Law,  30 J. 
ARTS MGMT., L., & SOC’Y 193, 206, App. A; ee a o DEAZLEY, supra note 68, at 3–4. 
89 An Act for preventing the frequent Abuses in printing seditious, treasonable and unlicensed 
Books and Pamphlets, and for regulating of Printing and Printing Presses (Licensing Act), 14 Car. 2, c. 
33 (1662)  (Eng.). 
90 See DEAZLEY, supra note 68, at 1–2; Chartrand, supra note 69, at 216; RANSOM, supra note 68, at 
89–90. 
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advocacy behind the scenes91 to help ensure the demise of licensing.  As pre-publication 
licensing of printed material ended,92 the door was left open to develop new concepts of 
this type of property and the rights to it.93  The early alignment of aspects of moral rights 
with the booksellers’ interests, however, did not bode well for moral rights’ 
development.94
B. The Statute of Anne 
In the common law countries, the Statute of Anne95 receives credit as the earliest 
statute of any kind protecting the rights of individual creators.96  It is generally 
considered the origin of modern Anglo-American copyright protection.97  It gave authors 
a property right, for a limited time period, in the work they created.98  The author of a 
book printed on April 10, 1710, who had not yet transferred the copyright, received 
statutory copyright protection for twenty-one years.99  For new works, the author 
received statutory copyright protection for fourteen years.100  An author who was still 
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91 See Shirata, supra note 88, at 195 (explaining “John Locke contributed much toward its repeal, 
writing to peers in the House of Lords and strongly condemning . . . the monopolies of the Stationers’ 
company”); DEAZLEY, supra note 68, at 2–3, 9–10.  The many ways in which John Locke’s broader, 
philosophical work influenced intellectual property concepts are beyond the scope of this article.  See 
generally Carys J. Craig, Lo k , Labour and Limiting the Author’s Right: A Warning Against a Lockean 
Approach to Copyrigh  Law, 28 QUEEN’S L.J. 1, 8–21 (2002) (reviewing Locke’s fruits-of-labor theory and 
its use underlying copyright law). 
92 See Chartrand, supra note 69, at 216 (“Government control was henceforth limited to post-
publication libel law.”). 
93 See DEAZLEY, supra note 68, at 5. 
94 See infra pp. 23, 26, 30–31. 
95  An Act for the Encouragement of Learning by Vesting the Copies of Printed Books in the 
Authors or Purchasers of Such Copies (Statute of Anne), 8 Ann., c. 19 (1710) (Eng.),  
http://www.copyrighthistory.com. 
96 See BIRRELL, supra note 68, at 19, 68 (referring to “the first copyright statute anywhere to be 
found—the 8th of Good Queen Anne” and “the . . . statute of Queen Anne, which . . . has the honour of 
being the first copyright statute at law to be found in the Corpus Juris of any State, either of the ancient 
or modern times”); ROSE, COPYRIGHT, supra note 66, at 4 (referring to “the world’s first copyright 
statute”). 
97 See, e.g., Fred Fisher Music Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons, 318 U.S. 643, 647 (1943) (“Anglo-
American copyright legislation begins in 1709 with the Statute of 8 Anne, c. 19.”); RANSOM, supra note 
68, at 106 (stating the statute “opened the period of modern copyright law”). 
98  8 Ann., c. 19, s. 1. 
99 Id.   
[F]rom and after the Tenth Day of April, One thousand seven hundred and ten, the 
Author of any Book or Books already Printed, who hath not Transferred to any other the 
Copy or Copies of such Book or Books, Share or Shares thereof, or the Bookseller or 
Booksellers, Printer or Printers, or other Person or Persons, who hath or have Purchased or 
Acquired the Copy or Copies of any Book or Books, in order to Print or Reprint the same, 
shall have the sole Right and Liberty of Printing such Book and Books for the Term of One 
and twenty Years, to Commence from the said Tenth Day of April, and no longer. 
Id. 
100 Id.   
[T]he Author of any Book or Books already Composed and not Printed and Published, or 
that shall hereafter be Composed, and his Assignee, or Assigns, shall have the sole Liberty of 
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alive after fourteen years received a second fourteen-year term of statutory copyright 
protection.101   
The Statute of Anne applied only to creators of literature, i.e., writers.102  
Nonetheless, it is an important stepping stone in conceptualizing the rights and property 
of these particular creators,103 and hence the rights of all artists.104  Instead of the earlier 
monopolies that encouraged booksellers to disseminate already-written works, the 
statute encouraged authors to create new works.105  Its stated goal was “the 
Encouragement of Learned Men to Compose and Write useful Books.”106  The political 
and legislative history of the statute shows continued efforts by the booksellers to hold 
onto their lucrative monopolies.107  Meanwhile, authors sought more than the small sum 
they could earn from the initial sale of a manuscript to a bookseller.108  Despite the 
competition between the economic interests of authors and booksellers, it was actually 
the higher aspiration to increase learning and knowledge that won the day in 
Parliament.109  At its inception, this first modern copyright statute concerned more than 
the purely economic interests of the owners of particular property rights.  “This element 
of the public interest, overlooked or perhaps ignored in other historical tales of the origin 
of copyright, once lay at its very core.”110
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Printing and Reprinting such Book and Books for the Term of fourteen Years, to Commence 
from the Day of the First Publishing the same, and no longer. 
Id. 
101 Id. (“[A]fter the Expiration of the said Term of Fourteen Years, the sole Right of Printing or 
Disposing of Copies shall return to the Authors thereof, if they are then Living, for another Term of 
Fourteen Years.”). 
102 Id. 
103  See Chartrand, supra note 69, at 218 (stating “it was the first law to formally recognize a 
[c]reator’s rights ….”). 
104 In some countries today, intellectual property rights, both copyright and moral rights, are the 
same for writers and artists in other media.  See, e.g., Soc. Le Chant de Monde, Gaz. Pal. 1953, 2, pan. 
jurispr., 191 (granting moral rights protection to classical music composer Shostakovich). 
105 See Ginsburg, Autho ship in Comparative Copyright, supra note 13, at 1064. 
106 8 Ann., c. 19, pmbl. 
107 See DEAZLEY, supra note 68, at 32–50.  The recent history of United States copyright law reveals 
a similar dynamic.  See Marci A. Hamilton, The Histo ical and Philosophical Unde pinnings o  the
Copyright Clause, 5 OCCASIONAL PAPERS IN INTELL. PROP. 347 (from Cardozo School of Law (1999) 
(suggesting the lobbying of particular industries creates copyright legislation, not “legislative 
deliberation over the public good”); Kwall, “Author-Stories,” supra note 13, at 6–7 (calling for a 
legislative approach more inclusive of artists’ voices). 
108 See BIRRELL, supra note 68, at 197 (“Indifference to the money honestly produced by the sale of 
books has never been a general characteristic of the British author, who for the most part has always 
taken whatever he could get.”).  But see DEAZLEY, supra note 70, at 31–32 (asserting Daniel Defoe was 
the first to argue for the rights of authors by suggesting a greater societal benefit). 
109 See DEAZLEY, supra note 68, at 46 (“[The legislators] secured the continued production of useful 
books through the striking of a culturally significant societal bargain, a trade-off involving, not the 
bookseller and censorial state, but the author, the bookseller and the reading public.”).  Three hundred 
years later, the exact same dynamic won the day for VARA.  Robinson, supra note 16, at 1936 (“VARA 
recognizes a public interest in the encouragement of artists to work . . . .  Appealing to the public interest 
. . . helped ensure the passage of the legislation by invoking a higher social good . . . .”); see a o Cal. Civ. 
Code § 987(a) (1982 & Supp. 2005) (“[T]here is also a public interest in preserving the integrity of 
cultural and artistic creations.”). 
110 See DEAZLEY, supra note 68, at 226; see also GILLIAN DAVIES, COPYRIGHT AND THE PUBLIC 
INTEREST 28–29 (2002). 
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A judiciary more attuned to this public interest element of intellectual property 
protection might well be more adept at applying VARA to contemporary disputes, 
because at its core VARA aims to protect societal interests111 in art by encouraging 
artists to create,112 just as the Statute of Anne aimed to encourage authors to write.113  
Yet after the passage of the Statute of Anne in 1709, the economic interests of individual 
litigants took center stage in intellectual property law and seem to have never left.114
C. The Engravers’ Act 
In the middle part of the eighteenth century, the London booksellers were busy 
running to the equity courts for injunctions against rival booksellers,115 and authors of 
literary works had a protective statute on the books that had not yet been interpreted by 
the law courts.116 During this time period, the engravers, who created and printed 
illustrations for books and for separate sale, lobbied for and received their own protective 
statute.117  William Hogarth, a well-known artist in his time, is generally credited with 
being savvy about the business side of his career, leading his fellow artists in the push 
for legislation, anticipating lines of contrary arguments, and persuading his friends in 
Parliament to pass the legislation.118  The Engravers’ Act of 1735 was the first statute to 
cover any works of visual art.119  Using the basic conceptual framework of the Statute of 
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111 See Ong, supra note 32, at 301–04 (analyzing different types of societal and authorial interests 
addressed by moral rights). 
112 See John Henry Merryman, The Public Inte est in Cu ural Property, 77 CAL. L. REV. 339, 345–
55 (1989) [hereinafter Merryman, Public Inte est] (explaining that people value cultural property for 
aesthetic, political, religious, and utilitarian reasons); John Henry Merryman, The Refrigera or of 
Bernard Buffet, 27 HASTINGS L. J. 1023, 1041 (1976) (“We are interested in protecting the work of art for 
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of this public interest.”); 133 CONG. REC. S11, 502 (daily ed. Aug. 6, 1987) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) 
(“In our country, as in every other country and civilization, artists are the recorders, and preservers of 
the national spirit.  The creative arts are an expression of the character of the Nation—they mirror its 
accomplishments, warn of its failings, and anticipate its future.”).  
113  8 Ann., c. 19, pmbl.  
114 The shift in focus in our intellectual property law was so complete for so long that almost three 
hundred years later, when VARA was passed, it was characterized as “one of the most extraordinary 
realignments of private property rights ever adopted by Congress.”  JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN & ALBERT 
E. ELSEN, LAW, ETHICS, AND THE VISUAL ARTS 283–84 (3d ed. 1998).   
115 See infra pp. 20–21.   
116  8 Ann., c. 19. 
117  An Act for the Encouragement of the Arts of designing, engraving and etching historical and 
other Prints, by vesting the Properties thereof in the Inventors and engravers, during the Time therein 
mentioned (Engravers’ Act), 8 Geo. 2, c. 13 (1735) (Eng.).  
118 See DEAZLEY, supra note 68, at 88–94 (providing a detailed legislative history); Mark Rose, 
Te hnology and Copyright in 1735: The Engravers’ Act, 21 THE INFO. SOC’Y 63, 64 (2005) [hereinafter 
Rose, Engravers’] (referring to Hogarth as “the force behind the bill,” as well as its primary beneficiary); 
SIMON STOKES, ART AND COPYRIGHT 23 (2003) (referring to Hogarth as “the force behind the Act”); 
JENNIFER S. UGLOW, HOGARTH: A LIFE AND A WORLD 268–71 (1997) (describing Hogarth’s legislative 
involvement, in a popular bibliography). 
119 See Rose, Engravers’, supra note 118, at 63 (referring to “the world’s second piece of copyright 
legislation”); STOKES, supra note 118, at 23 (referring to “the first statute to give legislative protection to 
artistic works”). 
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Anne,120 the Engravers’ Act gave “every person who shall invent and design, engrave, 
etch, or work in Mezzotinto or Chiaro Oscuro” a fourteen-year monopoly in printing that 
work.121  The Engravers’ Act brought intellectual property status and protection to non-
text printed works, and it was successful in decreasing the number of pirated copies.122  
The act was amended in 1767, to be “more effectual,”123 and again a year later.124
Although the Engravers’ Act did not directly label anything “moral rights” as we 
know the term today, it showed a much greater understanding of the creative process 
than the Statute of Anne had.125  The preamble began by stating:  “divers persons have 
by their own genius, industry, pains, and expence, invented and engraved, or worked in 
Mezzotinto, or Chiaro Oscuro, . . . .”126  The words “genius” and “invented” acknowledged 
the creative spark of the artist and the mental work involved.  Words like “industry,” 
“pains,” “engraved,” and “worked in” spoke more of the manual work involved and 
described the process of creating a print.  Where the Statute of Anne referred only to the 
authors of a finished product, a book,127 the preamble of the Engravers’ Act referred to 
people who had exercised industry, taken pains, and worked in a particular medium, 
emphasizing the process they had undertaken.128  Putting this acknowledgment in the 
preamble showed that protecting this process was the whole point of the statute. 
Lest any contemporary doubt that purpose, the preamble continued:  “print-sellers 
and other persons have of late, without the consent of the inventors, designers, and 
proprietors of such prints, frequently taken the liberty of copying, engraving, and 
publishing . . . base copies of such works . . . to the very great prejudice . . . of the 
inventors, designers, and proprietors thereof.”129  The concern for “base” copies, i.e., poor 
quality copies, that were made “to the very great prejudice” of the original artists was 
very similar to the current concern for the right of attribution and the right of integrity 
protected by today’s moral rights laws.  For example, VARA gives a visual artist “the 
right to prevent the use of his or her name as the author of the work of visual art in the 
event of a distortion, mutilation, or other modification of the work which would be 
prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation.”130  Prejudice to the artist, caused by 
distorting the original work, is a harm protected against by both the Engravers’ Act and 
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122 See DEAZLEY, supra note 68, at 89, 91–92 (contrasting the amount of pirating of specific works 
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123 An Act to amend and render more effectual an Act made in the eighth Year of the reign of King 
George the Second, for Encouragement of the Arts of Designing, Engraving and Etching, Historical and 
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Prints, 6 Geo. 3, c. 38 (1767) (Eng.); see al o Rose, Engravers’, supra note 118, at 65 (describing the 
addition of protection for engravers who used designs originally created by other painters and printers); 
STOKES, supra note 118, at 24 (describing extension of copyright protection to those who engraved 
others’ designs). 
124 17 Geo. 3, c. 57 (1777) (Eng.); see al o Rose, Engravers’, supra note 118, at 65 (describing a new 
requirement to seek permission before using another’s design).   
125 See Rose, Engravers’, supra note 118, at 63 (calling the differences in the acts “instructive”). 
126  8 Geo. 2, c. 13, pmbl.  
127  8 Ann., c. 19, s. 1.  
128 8 Geo.2, c. 13, pmbl. 
129 Id. 
130 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(2) (2000).  
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VARA. 
The Engravers’ Act preamble also included references to the economic concerns of 
the engravers, and these economic references were comfortably intertwined with the 
references to the creative process.  The preamble stated that the engravers had created 
their works “in hopes to have reaped the sole benefit of their labours,”131 and that the 
poor quality copies were made to their “detriment.”132  This language suggested that 
more than just artistic reputations were at stake.  In context, the engravers’ desire to 
“reap the sole benefit” would have meant the economic benefit.  Because the “detriment” 
caused by poor quality rip-offs was listed separately from the “prejudice” they caused, it 
likely meant detriment to the engravers’ incomes.  Indeed, there is evidence133 that 
Hogarth really was highly agitated by poor quality copies that distorted his creations and 
sold for less than his prints,134 harming both his reputation and his income. 
Including the economic and creative concerns together in the preamble showed that 
at this early stage of development, the English intellectual property law easily 
accommodated both sets of interests.  One long-winded, eighteenth-century preamble 
could address aspects of both copyright and moral rights.  Back in 1735, the possibility 
existed for this preamble to become a precursor of later Anglo-American arts legislation. 
In addition, the text of the statute gave the print engravers protection against 
copying “in the whole or in part, by varying, adding to or diminishing from the main 
Design.”135  At that time, many disputes between booksellers and authors centered on 
whether an abridged or annotated version of a book violated copyright,136 because the 
Statute of Anne only referred to a “book,”137 i.e., the whole entity.  The engravers had 
this matter settled in their statute.  Printing a version of an illustration that had 
something changed, taken away or added to it, without permission, would have violated 
the statute.  Given the limited technology of the time, this limited prohibition against 
publishing modified prints probably did cover all potential modification abuses, at least 
within the same medium. 
Protecting against this type of copying in particular showed a greater understanding 
of the creative process than the protection afforded books at that time.  For example, 
Hogarth often created engravings of busy scenes, with famous people in caricature.138  
The statute prohibited printing a copy of only part of a print, a copy “diminishing from 
the main design.”139  After passage of the statute, a rival could not choose one figure from 
Hogarth’s scene and copy it in a new print.  The statute also prohibited “adding to . . . the 
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main design,”140 i.e., printing a copy to which new images had been added.  Hogarth’s 
rival, for example, could not copy the busy scene, add a caricature of the king to the 
scene, and engrave it as a new print. 
Finally, the statute prohibited printing a copy “varying . . . the main design,”141  
varying the original in some way.  Presumably, this “varying” was something other than 
“adding to” or “diminishing from” the original design.  The items in the short list of 
prohibited activities are separated by commas and the disjunctive “or,”142 suggesting 
each item was a different prohibited activity.  If so, following the same example, a rival 
could not copy Hogarth’s scene, distort the proportions of the figures or change where 
they were located in the scene, and print the result. 
The Engravers’ Act, then, implicitly acknowledged the uniqueness of the parts of the 
whole in a work of visual art, as well as the uniqueness of their arrangement or 
relationship to each other.  These are aspects of visual art we now call “design elements” 
and “composition.”  These aspects of design are inherent in the creative process and the 
resulting work.  Recognizing and respecting the creative process in this way was a huge 
leap forward in the development of intellectual property law, yet, for the most part, it has 
been overlooked.143  In addition, the insightful language of this early statute was no 
accident.  Hogarth, the prime impetus for the legislation,144 understood well every aspect 
of being an artist.  He preferred to handle every step himself, both in terms of his art and 
his business.145
Granting these visual artists, the engravers, some control over the publication of 
modified versions of their work gave them much the same type of control now provided 
for by the right of integrity.146  “[V]arying, adding to or diminishing from the main 
design”147 would certainly fall under the “intentional distortion . . . or other modification” 
now prohibited by VARA.148   
Viewed from another angle, this statutory provision also appears to be the first to 
protect against unauthorized creation of some types of derivative works, a protection that 
has continued and expanded in the law over the centuries and exists in a broader form 
today.149  A “derivative work,” as the term implies, is a new work derived from a 
previously existing one.  Reprinting just one or just a few design elements from a larger 
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work would be creating a derivative work.  Likewise, adding one or more design elements 
to an existing work to create a new work would also create a derivative work.  The 
Engravers’ Act protected against these types of unauthorized derivative works, by 
prohibiting copying “by varying, adding to, or diminishing from” the original design.  
Again, protection from this type of copying showed a greater understanding of the 
creative process, with its implication that creating the elements of a design and the 
composition of the design were integral parts of how visual artists worked and worth 
protecting.  Again, given the technology of the time, the enumerated types of derivative 
works likely covered all the possible ways to create derivative works within the medium. 
Analyzing this first statutory protection for visual art shows the close relationship 
between moral rights’ protection of the integrity of a work and copyright’s protection 
against unauthorized derivative works.  Often, modifying a work of visual or performing 
art will create a derivative work.  Thus, an unauthorized process (protected against by 
the artist’s right of integrity in the work) may lead to an unauthorized result (protected 
against by the copyright owner’s exclusive right in derivative works).  Future 
refinements to the language of the Engravers’ Act and more experience with it might 
conceivably have lead the law in the direction of either our current moral rights provision 
or our current copyright provision, i.e., either towards the right of integrity or the 
exclusive right to create derivative works—or both.  In the days of proto intellectual 
property law, the possibility remained for the evolutionary tree to develop either or both 
branches.  At that moment in time, the door still remained open for the development of 
moral rights concepts in the Anglo-American law. 
Of course, it is striking (no pun intended) that the Engravers’ Act actually contained 
the word “design.”150  This inclusion was no accident, as evidenced by the legislative 
history of the Act.151  The laments of the engravers152 were not unlike the previously-
heard grievances of literary artists,153 but the language relevant to the engravers’ artistic 
complaints survived a much speedier154 and less contentious legislative process. 
The statute also made clear that anyone who bought original engraving plates from 
an engraver was purchasing both the plates and the right to reprint more copies using 
the plates.155  In this way, the Engravers’ Act provided a clearer delineation than the 
Statute of Anne did between owning the physical object itself and having the right to 
make copies, the copyright.156
 This delineation has remained in the law to the present day.157  Although moral 
rights were not involved in this particular distinction, this first-ever statute concerning 
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visual art made it clear that there were separate tangible and intangible property rights 
in the engravers’ work.  Once this concept was accepted, the possibility at least was 
opened for other intangible rights to develop158 and for those rights to remain separate 
from ownership of the physical object.  Moral rights, of course, are intangible rights held 
by the artist,159 no matter who owns the physical object,160 so this broader conceptual 
clarification of separate tangible and intangible rights in art seems another useful 
precursor to moral rights’ development.161
Thus, just as specific modern concepts for Anglo-American intellectual property law 
were starting to take shape, the Engravers’ Act accounted for some of the realities of the 
creative process, showing that economic and non-economic concerns swam in the same 
primordial soup of intellectual property law ideas.  It may simply have been an historical 
accident that there were savvy artists among the engravers and that engraving was the 
artistic field most closely related to writing literature, which already had statutory 
protection.  If so, it is an accident that began the gradual extension of legal protection 
from literature to the other arts.162  Unfortunately, thanks to another fluke of history, 
that protection eventually was limited to economic interests, as moral rights were lopped 
off the family tree. 
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D.  Early Copyright Cases 
The earliest English copyright cases under the Statute of Anne163 were Court of 
Chancery cases, where the judges sat in equity and the plaintiffs applied for injunctive 
relief.164  In many of these cases, after a complaint was filed, the defendants did not file 
answers and simply curtailed their behavior.165  When injunctions were granted, the 
defendants generally did not pursue matters further.166
Pressing ahead on a case to try the underlying substantive law issues would have 
required bringing a new case in a court of law (as opposed to the Chancellor’s court of 
equity), taking up more time and money.  Defendants in early English copyright disputes 
interpreted the Court of Chancery’s decisions as an indicator of the likely outcome in law 
courts167 and decided it was not worth the extra time and expense to pursue the legal 
issues.168  In addition, plaintiffs historically sought relief in a court of equity when they 
saw no real remedy for their problem at law.169  In the half century following the passage 
of the Statute of Anne, this would have been an accurate read of the situation.  There 
was no easily-discernible, helpful remedy in a law court for alleged copyright 
infringement, in part due to ambiguities in the statute170 and in part due to a lack of 
precedents to guide potential litigants.  It was generally assumed that trying to calculate 
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damages under the Statute of Anne would be a difficult, potentially futile exercise.171  
Also, plaintiffs likely perceived a law suit to be risky because the statute allowed a 
defendant to “plead the general issue,”172 “give the special matter in evidence,”173 and 
recover costs if successful.174  In addition, there was a major legal issue for which there 
was no definitive answer:  whether a common law copyright ever existed pre-dating the 
statute, and, if so, whether it reverted back into effect once the statutory time period had 
run.175
Thus, for half a century after passage of the Statute of Anne, the cases show efforts 
by booksellers to quickly and inexpensively prevent others from encroaching on their 
already-established, profitable monopolies.176  “The encouragement of learned men to 
compose and write useful books”177 for the greater social good, on which passage of the 
statute had depended, was not the litigants’ focus.  While at first glance it may seem 
curious that authors did not rush to the law courts to assert their new-found rights, this 
dynamic is not unlike the reluctance of artists today to assert their new-found rights 
under VARA.178  In addition, authors still did not control the means of production and 
had limited clout in the market place. 
E.  Millar v. Taylor 
Finally, in 1769, the English Court of King’s Bench considered the copyright case of 
Millar v. Taylor,179 applying the Statute of Anne180 head on for the first time.181  Millar v. 
Taylor concerned the rights of an author, as previously, in the lay sense of the word 
“author,” a writer of literature.182  One of the attorneys who argued skillfully for the 
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was perceived to be considerably more expedient than following an infringer at common law.”). 
177 8 Ann., c. 19, pmbl. 
178 See supra notes 36–39 and accompanying text.  
179 Millar v. Taylor, 4 Burr. 2303, 98 Eng. Rep. 201 (K.B. 1769). 
180  8 Ann., c. 19. 
181 Millar, 4 Burr. at 2303, 98 Eng. Rep. at 201 (“This case was a revival of the old and often-
litigated question concerning literary property : and it was the first determination which the question 
ever received, in this Court of King’s Bench.”). 
182 Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000) (defining a “work of authorship” as: “(1) literary works; (2) musical 
works, including any accompanying words; (3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music; (4) 
pantomimes and choreographic works; (5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; (6) motion pictures 
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plaintiff was William Blackstone,183  and this was exactly the time period when the four 
volumes of Blackstone’s Commentaries184 were being carried around the colonies in the  
saddle bags of American lawyers.185  In 1769 the American colonies had not yet declared 
their independence, and an English case like Millar would have been considered 
applicable precedent in the colonies.  Because of trade disruptions during the American 
Revolution, Millar was the last English copyright decision American lawyers and jurists 
had access to until the war was over.186  And so, what the justices in Millar had to say 
about the rights of literary creators sheds some light on what could have happened later 
in England and the United States, but did not. 
Millar was a dispute about a book called The Sea ons, written by James Thomson.s
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 The author published the book in London from 1727 to 1729.188  The jury found that 
Andrew Millar purchased the book in 1729, “for a valuable and full consideration . . . to 
him and his heirs and assigns for ever,”189 and both Millar and the jury seem to have 
assumed the “common law copyright” was part of the deal.190  Millar registered the book 
in the registry of the Company of Stationers, the method at that time by which London 
printers and booksellers still gave notice of their copyright in a book.191 The author, 
Thomson, died in 1748.  Then in 1763, Robert Taylor began publishing and selling copies 
of the book.192  Since the Statute of Anne only provided copyright protection for a 
maximum of twenty-eight years,193 Millar’s statutory copyright protection, which started 
in 1729 when he purchased the book from the author, would have run out by 1763, 
thirty-four years later. 
The main questions before the Court were whether any common law copyright 
existed before the passage of the statute, whether the statute pre-empted and totally 
extinguished any such common law copyright, or whether a common law copyright pre-
existing the statute remained after the statutory copyright term.194  The lawyers for each 
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and other audiovisual works; (7) sound recordings; and (8) architectural works.”). 
183 Millar, 4 Burr. at 2303, 98 Eng. Rep. at 201 (listing “the second [argument], by Mr. Blackstone, 
for the plaintiff”). 
184 SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (1765–1769).  Blackstone 
covers copyright in his Commentaries.  SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF 
ENGLAND, 9th ed., 405–07 (1783) (updated edition incorporating Millar and later Donaldson decisions) 
(facsimile ed. 1978). 
185 See, e.g., Christopher L. Eisgruber, John Mar hall’s Judicial Rheto ic, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 439, 
443 (explaining the importance to the growth of American law of the Commentaries being both well-
organized and compact enough to fit in saddle bags). 
186    Between 1773 and 1783 the United States was at war with Great Britain and there  
was no tradebetween the two B including in law books and legal decisions.  
Accordingly, the last major copyright decision of the British courts current in legal 
circles of what was becoming the United States was Millar v. Taylor. 
Chartrand, supra note 69, at 223. 
187 Millar, 4 Burr. at 2305–06, 98 Eng. Rep. at 203. 
188 Id. at 2306, 98 Eng. Rep. at 203. 
189 Id. 
190 Id. 
191 Id. 
192 Id. at 2308, 98 Eng. Rep. at 204.  
193 See supra notes 100, 101 and accompanying text. 
194 The justices did not word the issues exactly the same way.  For example, Justice Willes listed 
two issues, Millar, 4 Burr. at 2311, 98 Eng. Rep. at 206, while Justice Aston listed three issues id., at 
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side of course presented the arguments they believed best aided their clients’ interests;195 
they were not necessarily crafting lofty pronouncements for the sake of posterity.  For 
the individual litigants, the question of whether there was any remaining copyright to be 
claimed doubtless was a simple economic question:  whoever owned the copyright would 
derive economic benefit from it.  The author himself was dead, and his heirs were not 
parties in the case. 
The plaintiff was simply a bookseller who wanted to maintain his monopoly, as the 
booksellers had always done.  He had purchased the book from the author, and he would 
have argued for the common law copyright and reversion to it once the statutory time 
period had run.  The defendant wanted to sell the book now that the statutory time 
period for copyright had run, so he would have argued that the statute totally 
extinguished any previous copyright, i.e., no copyright at all remained after twenty-eight 
years.  The defendant, a competing bookseller, ended up taking the side of the argument 
previously belonging to authors and the reading public, the side the Statute of Anne was 
supposed to protect.  And so the defendant had the statutory argument to make, while 
the plaintiff had the common law argument. 
While deciding this issue, the justices’ analyses flowed in many directions.  They 
drew on a wide variety of sources196 including common law,197 John Locke’s natural law 
ideas,198 related civil law concepts,199 and moral concerns.200  They described and 
interpreted what was, in effect, the legislative history of the Statute of Anne.201  They 
analyzed whether there was any common law copyright to begin with, and, if so, what it 
protected.202  During this analysis they went back to basics, examining what “property” 
was203 and what it meant to have a right in property.204
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2336, 98 Eng. Rep. at 219. 
195 Blackstone himself made money by assigning to booksellers the copyright in his Commentaries, 
BIRRELL, supra note 68, at 131 n.1, so he likely had a personal interest in the outcome of the case, too.  
As a very prominent author, Blackstone actually could make more money selling perpetual copyrights in 
the different editions of his work than he could make selling limited, twenty-eight year copyrights, so it 
is not surprising he argued on the side of the plaintiff, for the common law copyright. 
196 See, e.g., Millar, 4 Burr. at 2354, 98 Eng. Rep. at 228 (Aston, J.) (basing his conclusions “upon 
every principle of reason, natural justice, morality and common law”). 
197 See, e.g., id. at 2343, 98 Eng. Rep. at 223 (Aston, J.) (citing DODDRIDGE, THE ENGLISH LAWYER 
154–61 (1631) (stating the common law “is founded on the law of nature and reason” and “derived from 
. . . natural and moral philosophy, from the civil and canon law, from logic, from the use, custom and 
conversation among men”)). 
198 See, e.g., id. at 207 (Willes, J.) (referring to Milton’s 1644 speech supporting copyright and 
asserting “this copyright could, at that time, stand upon no other foundation, than natural justice and 
common law”) (emphasis added); id. at 2355, 98 Eng. Rep. at 229 (Yates, J.) (asserting English personal 
property law “had its grand foundation in natural law”); see also Craig, supra note 91, at 8–21. 
199 See Millar, 4 Burr. at 2344, 98 Eng. Rep. at 223 (Aston, J.) (drawing from “the civil and canon 
law,” and quoting Justinian); see generally Edward D. Re, The Roman Contribution to the Common Law, 
29 FORDHAM L. REV. 447 (1960–61); ee al o infra pp. 25–26. 
200 Millar, 4 Burr. at 2342, 98 Eng. Rep. at 222 (Aston, J.) (referring to “moral rectitude” and “[t]he 
law of nature and truth, and the light of reason”); id. at 2399, 98 Eng. Rep. at 253 (Lord Mansfield, C.J.) 
(referring to “moral justice and fitness”). 
201 See id. at 2317, 2332–33, 98 Eng. Rep. at 209, 217. 
202 See, e.g., id. at 2341–42, 2358–66, 98 Eng. Rep. at 221–22, 230–35. 
203 See, e.g., id. at  2338–40, 2355–57, 98 Eng. Rep. 220–21, 229–30. 
204 Many law students in the United States start their first-year property law course by reading 
Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175, 2 Am. Dec. 264 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805), the case discussing whether a hunter 
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The modern sense of rights in intellectual property were still very much in 
development, and concepts now found separated in copyright law’s protection of economic 
interests and moral rights’ protection of creative interests often sit side-by-side in the 
Millar justices’ analysis, sometimes in the same sentence.205  For example, in Justice 
Aston’s final sentence of his opinion, words sit side-by-side that point to the economic 
interests of copyright and the creative interests of moral rights:  “And I hope the learned 
and industrious will be permitted from henceforth, not only to reap the fame, but the 
profits of their ingenious labours, without interruption; to the honour and advantage of 
themselves and their families.”206  Protecting both “fame” and “profits” were easily 
coordinated legal goals in this eighteenth-century English jurist’s mind; so was 
protecting both “honour” and “advantage.”  His understanding of the nature of 
intellectual property expanded to include and value all these concepts.  Today, while 
“fame” and “honor” are values VARA recognizes,207 “profits” and “advantage” belong 
squarely to the traditional economic focus of copyright law.208
In the lone dissent, Justice Yates focused on the intangible, incorporeal nature of 
the property that the rights would attach to, and he homed in on something that still 
seems to be a sticky point in the law:209  “[T]he fallacy lies in the equivocal use of the 
word ‘property;’ which sometimes denotes the right of the person; . . . sometimes, the 
object itself.  Here, the question is upon the object itself, not the person.”210  He likely 
was pointing to the difference between owning the book and owning the copyright, 
extending the distinction between tangible and intangible rights in intellectual property 
that the Engravers’ Act had first clarified.211  Because these judges did not strictly 
distinguish aspects of copyright from moral rights, it is possible “the right of person” 
referred to rights we would now separate into the two categories.  Justice Yates did 
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pursuing a wild fox can have a property right in it.  Pierson was decided in New York only twenty-five 
years after Millar, and readers will see similar modes of analysis and expressions in the two cases.  
205 The flowery language and complex syntax of eighteenth-century jurists do not always make for 
quick reading.  Any proponents of plain English in the law who feel pessimistic about their success need 
only read a page of eighteenth-century English legal prose to realize what a long way the plain English 
movement has come. 
206 Millar, 4 Burr. at 2354, 98 Eng. Rep. at 229. 
207 VARA gives a visual artist “the right to prevent the use of his or her name as the author of the 
work of visual art in the event of a distortion, mutilation, or other modification of the work which would 
be prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation,” 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(2) (2000) (emphasis added), and the 
right “to prevent any intentional distortion, mutilation, or other modification of that work which would 
be prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation,” 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(A) (emphasis added). 
208 See Jimmy A. Frazier, On Moral Rights, Artist-Centered Legisla ion, and the Role of the Sta e 
in Art Worlds: Notes on Building a So iology of Copyright Law, 70 TUL. L. REV. 313, 317 (1995) 
(criticizing the focus on economic rights of United States copyright law and copyright scholars and 
offering a sociologically-based alternative). 
209  See generally Richard A. Epstein, Liberty Versus Property?  Cracks in the Founda i ns of 
Copyright Law, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1 (2005); Adam Mossoff,  Copyright Property?, 42 SAN DIEGO L. 
REV. 29 (2005). 
210 Millar, 4 Burr. at 2362, 98 Eng. Rep. at 233; see al o Kwall, “Author-Stories,” supra note 13, at 
16 (“History shows that delineating the exact nature of the author’s interest always has been 
problematic . . . .  [W]orks of authorship are like other forms of property in that they have the potential 
for commodification, but they differ from more tangible types of property . . . because they also entail 
important personal interests.”).   
211 See supra p. 18–19.  
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acknowledge a “moral obligation” behind basic property law concepts,212 but he refused to 
extend it to intellectual property absent specific statutory protection.213  His dissent is 
important, because it previews the law’s future evolution. 
Lord Mansfield, voting with the majority, had the final word.  His opinion went the 
furthest towards the concepts now protected as moral rights.  First, he hinted at the 
right of attribution: “It is just, that another should not use [an author’s] . . . name, 
without his consent.” 214  And then, Lord Mansfield described well some of the harms that 
moral rights protect against: 
He is no more master of the use of his own name.  He has no control over the 
correctness of his own work.  He can not prevent additions.  He can not retract 
errors.  He can not amend; or cancel a faulty edition.  Any one may print, 
pirate, and perpetuate the imperfections, the disgrace and against the will of 
the author; may propagate sentiments under his name, which he disapproves, 
repents and is ashamed of.215
What Lord Mansfield described was essentially a lack of the rights of attribution,216 
integrity,217 and disclosure,218 and its effect on the honor and reputation of a writer.219  
He described these harms in the context of his reasoning in favor of the perpetual 
common law copyright, on the side of the monopolistic booksellers, because he felt if the 
statute put an end to all copyright after twenty-eight years, authors would suffer the 
enumerated harms.220
Many lawyers in the United States learned in school that Blackstone’s 
Commentaries brought the common law to the American colonies and early states,221 and 
so he was a champion of the common law, yet Blackstone and his contemporaries in 
English legal circles knew and were influenced by civil law.222  Although the law of 
ancient Rome, did not address intellectual property per se,223 it did recognize 
plagiarism.224  This concept of literary theft was an early kernel, from which the Roman 
                                                                                                                                     
 
212 Millar, 4 Burr. at 2365, 98 Eng. Rep. at 235.  
213 Id. at 2395, 98 Eng. Rep. at 250. 
214 Id. at 2398, 98 Eng. Rep. at 252; cord, 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(1). 
215 Millar, 4 Burr. at 2398, 98 Eng. Rep. at 252.  As one scholar points out, however, Lord 
Mansfield’s articulation of authors’ personal rights was never actually applied to any future case.  
Swack, supra note 64, at 381. 
216 See supra p. 4. 
217 See supra p. 4–5. 
218 See supra p. 8, n.54. 
219 See supra pp. 4–5 and accompanying footnotes. 
220 Millar, 4 Burr. at 2399, 98 Eng. Rep. 253. 
221 1–4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES; see STEPHEN B. PRESSER & JAMIL S. ZAINALDIN, 
LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE IN AMERICAN HISTORY 295 (5th ed. 2003) (asserting only the Bible had more 
influence on the history of American institutions).  
222 See Re, supra note 199, at 452 (stating “Sir William Blackstone, in his opening Vinerian lecture 
at Oxford, on the 25th of October, 1758, commended the study of civil law.”). 
223 See RICHARD ROGERS BOWKER, COPYRIGHT AND ITS HISTORY 8 (1912) (identifying a few brief 
mentions of literary property in ancient Rome).  For a comprehensive review of the law of ancient Rome, 
see RUSS VERSTEEG, LAW IN THE ANCIENT WORLD 269–367 (2002).  
224 See RANSOM, supra note 68, at 19 n.4 (citing studies about literary property in ancient Rome); 
Swack, supra note 64, at 366–67 (analyzing concepts of authors’ relationship to their work in ancient 
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law’s progeny, the civil law of Europe,225 began developing intellectual property concepts, 
as the need arose.226  Indeed, moral rights concepts developed in the civil law shortly 
after this time period, in the early nineteenth century.227  So the justices in Millar drew 
from a primordial soup of legal ideas that included, in part, ideas that several decades 
later would develop into artists’ moral rights in France.228  The familiarity with civil law 
concepts that many eighteenth-century English lawyers and jurists shared229 may 
explain some of the ease with which they bandied back and forth concepts that today 
seem more rigidly embedded in either the civil law or the common law intellectual 
property scheme.  As Professor Edward Re reminds us: “‘It is idle to suppose that such 
knowledge . . . was not used; especially in the solution of those problems for which the 
ancient customs made no provision.’”230
In England in 1769, a law suit brought by an owner of a literary creation, claiming a 
right in the creation after statutory copyright protection expired, was one such problem 
for which no specific provision had been previously made.  The eighteenth-century 
English jurists had a knowledge of civil law concepts that most United States jurists 
today cannot claim, and they used this knowledge, along with other sources, while 
solving this novel issue for which they had no precedent:  whether a perpetual common 
law copyright existed before the Statute of Anne and survived after the statutory term of 
protection had run.  
The outcome of the case was that a common law copyright was found to exist.231  
And this common law copyright was found to have pre-existed the time-limiting statute 
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Rome). 
225 See VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 64, at 41 (noting that when the British relied on the common 
law, “the rest of Renaissance Europe was busy adopting the rediscovered Roman legal code”). 
226 For an overview of the development of copyright and moral rights law in France, see Chartrand, 
supra note 69, at 230–33; DAVIES, supra note 110, at 129–77.  
227 A French court referred to the right of attribution as early as 1837.  See Raymond Sarrauté, 
Current Theory on the Mora  Right of Authors and Artists Under French Law, 16 AM. J. COMP. L. 465, 
478 (1968) (quoting D. Repertoire de Jurisprudence V, Prop. Lit. et Art. no. 194). 
228 See Swack, supra note 64, at 370, 373–74 (tracing the emergence of the droit moral in France). 
229 See generally Re, supra note 199.  
230 Re, supra note 199, at 469 (quoting JENKS, A SHORT HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 20 (2d ed. rev. 
1922)).  Professor Re describes much earlier use of Roman law concepts to fill in where there was a 
paucity of English common law precedent.  Re, supra note 199, at 471–75 (describing the borrowing of 
Roman law form and substance in Henry de Bracton’s Tractatus de Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae 
(1258)); see a o VERSTEEG, supra note 223, at 269 (crediting Roman law with “a significant influence in 
English law”). 
231 As one scholar summarizes Millar: 
The decision, handed down by Lord Mansfield’s court, represents no less than a 
triumph of creative historical revisionism and legal advocacy.  Notwithstanding the 
reality of the Statute of Anne, and its immediate legal progeny, the history of the first 
four decades of lawful book publishing in Britain had been carefully re-crafted.  The 
London monopolists had picked a number of disparate legal-historical threads, bound 
them together within a compelling ontological framework, and created a new, 
altogether different, coherent form.  The perpetual common law right had literally 
been written, talked and argued into existence. 
DEAZLEY, supra note 68, at 178–79; ee a so BIRRELL, supra note 68, at 112 (“A special jury verdict was 
recorded in which the jury were made to repeat upon oath the cock-and-bull story of how long before 
Queen Anne perpetual copyrights had been made the subject of family settlements for the provision of 
Mrs. Bookseller and her babes.”). 
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and to be perpetual.232  The overall question had been whether copyright’s existence was 
limited by the statute; the statute supported author’s economic rights, gave those rights 
for only a limited time, and did not mention any aspect of moral rights.  So the 
arguments in favor of perpetual protection for literary works ended up being arguments 
for the booksellers.  Once again, in the twisting history of Anglo-American intellectual 
property law, moral rights ended up on the side of the booksellers, helping to protect 
their economic interests in maintaining their monopolies, rather than helping authors to 
protect their personal interests in their works.  The defendant, a rival bookseller, was 
just trying to wrestle from a monopolistic bookseller a limited time period during which 
he could capitalize on a work.  When he lost, the old-line booksellers won.  And moral 
rights related arguments became firmly embedded in the booksellers’ camp, strange 
bedfellows indeed—and, eventually, fateful ones.  
Interestingly, all the Millar justices agreed that an author owned the copyright in 
his work before it was published.233  This same principle is reflected in current American 
copyright law234 and the French droit de divulga ion.t
                                                                                                                                    
235  Both these rights give an author 
full control of a work before it is published, including the right to decide when, or even if, 
he will part with his creation.  And both these rights apply in the modern law to 
“authors” in the United States copyright sense of the word, i.e., to literary, visual, and 
performing artists.236  Although providing copyright upon creation focuses on economic 
control237 and the droit de divulgation is concerned with creative control,238 they provide 
similar support for artistic decisions.239  Perhaps this right is consistent in the two 
intellectual property law schemes because it was such a well-accepted concept before the 
English judges cut off the other moral rights for authors, allowing for its continuation, 
reinforcement, and eventual extension to the visual and performing artists. 
III.  HOW DONALDSON LOPPED OFF THE BRANCH 
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232  While the notion of a perpetual intellectual property right may seem unusual to Americans, in 
France artists’ moral rights are perpetual.  Law No. 57-298, art. 6. 
233 Millar v. Taylor, 4 Burr. 2303, 2331, 2340, 2355, 2396, 98 Eng. Rep. 201, 221, 216, 229, 251 (K.B. 
1769).  
234 See 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2000) (“Copyright in a work . . . vests initially in the author . . . of the 
work.”); 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (“Copyright in a work . . . subsists from its creation . . . .”).  Under earlier 
copyright statutes, a United States author had full control over when or even whether to publish a work, 
see An Act to amend and consolidate the Acts respecting Copyright, ch. 320, § 2, Pub. L. No. 60-349 
(Mar. 4, 1909) (“[N]othing in this Act shall be construed to annul or limit the right of the author or 
proprietor of an unpublished work, . . . to prevent the copying, publication, or use of such unpublished 
work without his consent, . . . .”), although copyright itself did not exist before the formalities of 
publication and notice, id. at § 9 (“[A]ny person entitled thereto by this Act may secure copyright for his 
work by publication thereof with the notice of copyright required by this Act; . . . .”).     
235 Law No. 57-298, art. 56; see al o Eden C. Whistler, CA Paris, 1898 D.P. II 465, aff’d, 1900 D.P. I 
497 (Cour de Cassation) (holding that the artist could refuse to deliver a commissioned portrait even 
after exhibiting it). 
236 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).  
237 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (providing the right to, inte  alia, sell, rent, or lease a copyright). 
238 Law No. 57-298, art. 56. 
239 Each law, of course, also provides the artist with some economic control of the work. 
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A.  Donaldson v. Beckett 
The second seminal case brought under the Statute of Anne was Donaldson v. 
Becket, in 1774.240  Like its predecessor, this case also was not decided in a vacuum.241  
The attorneys for each side had been involved in earlier copyright cases, including 
Tonson v. Collins and Millar v.Taylor.242  William Blackstone, who had been one of the 
attorneys in Millar, was now on the bench,243 and some of the other judges had been 
involved in the earlier cases, too.244
The facts in Donaldson have a familiar ring.  In January 1729, the author, James 
Thomson, sold to a bookseller, Andrew Millar (yes, the same Thomson and the same 
Millar), the copyright in two works, a tragedy entitled Sophonisba and a soon-to-be 
popular poem entitled Spring.245  In July 1729, Mr. Thomson sold the copyright to several 
other poems to bookseller John Millan.246  Among these were poems entitled Summer, 
Autumn, Winter, and “A Poem Sacred to the Memory of Sir Isaac Newton.”247  Then in 
June 1738, Millan sold his rights in these works to Millar.248
Interestingly, along with the books, the transaction included “the several plates of 
the prints of the seasons, and the plate of the print of Sir Isaac Newton’s monument ; all 
which prints had been usually bound up with the poems.”249  Thus, works of visual art 
were part of the transaction that underlay the dispute.  They were not specifically 
mentioned in the reasoning of the case, however, and the Engravers’ Act250 was not 
applied.251
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240 There are three main reports of this case: 
(1) Donaldsons v. Becket, 4 Burr. 2408, 98 Eng. Rep. 257 (K.B. 1774) (inserted at the end of 
Burrow’s report of Millar); 
(2) Donaldson v. Beckett, 2 Bro. P.C. 129, 1 Eng. Rep. 837 (H.L. 1774); and 
(3) COBBETT’S PARL. HIST., supra note 69, at 954. 
These reports differ in terms of the aspects of the case and the details they include. 
241 See Tonson v. Collins, 1 Black. W. 301, 96 Eng. Rep. 169; M llar, 4 Burr. 2303, 98 Eng. Rep. 201; 
BIRRELL, supra note 68, at 121 (Indeed, “this was no lawyer’s question.  The question of literary property 
was discussed everywhere and by everybody.”); RANSOM, supra note 68, at 4 (suggesting that “[b]ecause 
Englishmen attached great significance to written things, early copyright in England followed a course of 
experience almost as wide as national life”).   
242 See DEAZLEY, supra note 68, at 195. 
243 Donaldson, 2 Bro. P.C. at 145, 1 Eng. Rep. at 847 (listing the justices and how they voted on the 
case); Donaldsons, 4 Burr. at 2411, 98 Eng. Rep. at 259 (“Mr. Justice Ashurst delivered the opinion of 
Mr. Justice Blackstone[,] who was absent, being confined to his room with the gout . . . .”). 
244 Donaldsons, 4 Burr. at 2417, 98 Eng. Rep. at 262.  Lord Mansfield, the Chief Justice, recused 
himself from the case, since he had already made his decision on the central legal issue known in Millar. 
Id. (“It was notorious, that Lord Mansfield adhered to his opinion . . . .  But it being very unusual (from 
reasons of delicacy) for a peer to support his own judgment, upon an appeal to the House of Lords, he did 
not speak.”).   
245 Donaldson, 2 Bro. P.C. at 129, 1 Eng. Rep. at 837. 
246 Id. at 129, 1 Eng. Rep. at 838. 
247 Id. 
248 Id. 
249 Id. 
250  8 Geo. 2, c. 13.  
251  In a select recitation of the history of the main issue, one of the attorneys did make a passing 
reference to the 1767 statutory amendment giving protection to Hogarth’s widow.  COBBETT’S PARL. 
HIST., supra note 69, at 962 (referring to, without citing, 6 Geo. 3, c. 38). 
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Mr. Millar died in June 1768, and in January 1769, his executors auctioned off the 
copyrights in the Thomson poems.  Thomas Becket and the other respondents in 
Donaldson were the highest bidders.252
Meanwhile, in 1768, Alexander Donaldson printed a volume of poems by James 
Thomson, entitled The Seasons (containing much the same underlying work as the 
publication that was still in dispute in the Millar case), which included several of the 
poems for which Millar had owned the copyright.253  Donaldson was one of many Scottish 
booksellers who over the years challenged the London booksellers’ efforts to maintain 
their monopoly.254  He reasoned that if the poet sold the copyright in his new works in 
1729, according to the Statute of Anne, the copyright would expire fully twenty-eight 
years later in 1757.255  And so in 1768, Donaldson felt free to print and sell the poems.256
As was the routine,257 Becket and the other auction winners first sought an 
injunction against Donaldson in the Chancery Court, in 1777.258  The Chancellor ordered 
a perpetual injunction and an accounting of how much Donaldson owed Becket for the 
sold copies, but Donaldson responded by appealing to the law courts.259
The main legal issue squarely before the court in Donaldson was the same main 
issue as in Millar: was there a common law copyright that existed before the Statute of 
Anne and that continued to exist after the statutory copyright term ended?260  In other 
words, was there any type of copyright in the poems that Thomson transferred to Millar 
and Millan, that continued to exist for more than twenty-eight years, so that Millar’s 
estate included these copyrights upon his death, or did Becket and the others spend their 
money at auction on something that did not exist? 
The Donaldson case was a close call,261 and it seems to look in two directions 
conceptually.  In this watershed case of statutory interpretation, there were still 
references to “natural rights”262 and lingering mentions of principles dating back to 
                                                                                                                                     
252 Donaldson, 2 Bro. P.C. at 130, 1 Eng. Rep. at 838. 
253 Id. 
254 See ROSE, COPYRIGHT, supra note 66, at 5 (stating the Scottish booksellers sought “an 
independent role for themselves as reprinters of popular titles”).   
255 Donaldson, 2 Bro. P.C. at 130–31, 1 Eng. Rep. at 838–39. 
256 It does not require a great leap of imagination to suspect Donaldson perceived a window of 
opportunity for making some money, when he learned Millar had died while his case still lingered in 
court, without a final decision on the existence of the common law copyright. 
257 See supra pp. 20–21. 
258 Donaldson, 2 Bro. P.C. at 130, 1 Eng. Rep. at 838; COBBETT’S PARL. HIST., supra note 69, at 955 
n.*. 
259 Donaldsons, 4 Burr. at 2408, 98 Eng. Rep. at 257; Donaldson, 2 Bro. P.C. at 132, 1 Eng. Rep. at 
839; COBBETT’S PARL. HIST., supra note 69, at 955 n.* (all listing the five separate, but overlapping 
issues in the case).   
260 Donaldsons, 4 Burr. at 2408, 98 Eng. Rep. at 257–58; Donaldson, 2 Bro. P.C. at 144–45, 1 Eng. 
Rep. at 846–47; COBBETT’S PARL. HIST., supra note 69, at 970–71. 
261 The decision was close on the key issue, with a vote of 6 to 5 to deny the existence of the common 
law copyright.  See BIRRELL, supra note 68, at 126–27 (listing each vote); DEAZLEY, supra note 68, at 
199–205 (charting each judge’s vote as reported in contemporaneous accounts and suggesting conflicting 
reports); cf. ROSE, COPYRIGHT, supra note 66, at 154–58 (suggesting the clerks may have counted wrong, 
switching the direction of the slim margin). 
262 See, e.g., COBBETT’S PARL. HIST., supra note 69, at 980–81 (Aston, J.) (arguing “in favour of 
literary property from the natural rights of the subject” and voting for the perpetual common law 
copyright). 
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ancient Rome.263  There was also a subtle shift, however, in the tone and emphasis, 
particularly in the reports of the opinions of the justices who voted with the narrow 
majority.264  They articulated their ideas with language that sounds more familiar in 
modern copyright law.  For example, a few of the justices referred to books as “what was 
now termed literary property,”265 showing an awareness that consensus was solidifying 
around new nomenclature for evolving concepts.  Chief Justice De Grey was well aware 
he was working on changing the status quo, stating that the question before them could 
“be fairly treated as a new question” and referring to “this new species of property.”266  
He also rejected relying upon principles of “moral fitness.”267
In Donaldson, there was greater concern for the fair assignment of economic benefits 
to the author,268 as opposed to allowing economic control to vest early on and remain with 
a publisher forever.  But, repeating language from Millar, even where the decision 
encourages an author to “become the guardian of his own fame,”269 evoking the “honor 
and reputation” protected by moral rights,270 the goal is that “learned and industrious 
men will be enabled to reap not only the fame, but the profits of their labours . . . . ”271  
The acknowledged result is “the honour and advantage of themselves and their 
families.”272  So, even while the case focused more on economics, in late eighteenth-
century England, both honor and economic advantage were still commended in the same 
breath by some of the jurists. 
Donaldson stands for the proposition that “[t]he statute of Anne was not declaratory 
of the common law, but introductive of a new law, to give learned men a property which 
they had not before.”273  So all that the booksellers Millar and Millan received from the 
poet Thomson was a twenty-eight year copyright, and nothing remained after that to 
auction off.  And so Donaldson arrives at the opposite answer from Millar, and it is 
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263 Although the Solicitor General made a reference to Grotius (a Renaissance Dutch jurist) citing 
Paulus (a Roman lawyer), COBBETT’S PARL. HIST., supra note 69, at 964, Justice Aston stated that “[i]t 
was not necessary . . . to advert either to the Grecians or Romans to discover the principles of the 
common law of England.”  Id. at 980.  Lord Littleton also “traced the origin of the arts and sciences from 
Greece to Rome, . . . and at last seated them in Great Britain.”  Id. at 1002. 
264 The reports summarize a great deal of the justices’ oral opinions, and it is entirely possible that 
the details which were printed were selected subjectively after the fact, when the outcome of the case 
was known, and so slanted a bit towards the outcome. 
265 COBBETT’S PARL. HIST., supra note 69, at 982, 985, 988 (Perrott, J.) (referring to “what was now 
termed literary property”), (Adams, J.) (referring to “what was now termed literary property”), (De Grey, 
Lord C.J.) (referring to “some interest in right of authorship . . . ; which is termed literary property”).  
266 Id. at 990. 
267 Id.; ee al  id. at 998 (Lord Camden) (rejecting arguments about “moral fitness”). 
268 For example: 
It will continue to be the ingratitude of mankind, that they who teach wisdom 
by the surest means, shall generally live poor and unregarded; as if they were born 
only for the public, and had no interest in their own well-being, but were to be lighted 
up like tapers, and waste themselves for the benefit of others. 
Donaldson v. Beckett, 2 Bro. P.C. 129, 143, 1 Eng. Rep. 837, 845–46 (H.L. 1774). 
269 Id. at 142, 1 Eng. Rep. at 845. 
270 See supra pp. 4–5.   
271 Donaldson, 2 Bro. P.C. at 144, 1 Eng. Rep. at 845. 
272 Id. 
273 Id. at 140, 1 Eng. Rep. at 843. 
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Donaldson that sticks.274
Donaldson is said to be the case that wiped out moral rights in Anglo-American 
law.275  Yet the way in which it so profoundly influenced the future of Anglo-American 
intellectual property law276 was pretty tangential to the focus of the decision.  The 
justices were not voting directly about moral rights or any kind of dispute between moral 
rights per se and economic rights.  They focused on the historic dispute in England 
between booksellers and authors, while also showing a growing understanding of the 
public’s interest.277  
Donaldson shut the door on moral rights simply by settling the dispute in favor of 
statutory copyright.  By a one vote margin, Donaldson declared that there was no 
copyright at common law and copyright was only a creature of statute.278  If protection 
for literary property came from the statute only, that protection was limited to the terms 
of the statute.279  The Statute of Anne had no provisions for moral rights.  It created a 
temporary monopoly, giving authors an opportunity, beyond the first sale of a 
manuscript, by which they could benefit economically.  Authors could sell a fourteen-year 
copyright,280 and then sell a fourteen-year renewal copyright.281  The first ever copyright 
statute simply did not account for non-economic values, beyond the hortatory language in 
the preamble acknowledging the public’s interest,282 because its focus was wrestling 
control of literary property away from the booksellers.  It was a legislative act that set 
the direction for the development of intellectual property law in common law countries.283 
 And it was the Donaldson decision, applying the statute head on for the second time, 
that closed the door on the development of moral rights in Anglo-American jurisprudence 
for over 200 years.284
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274 Id. at 145, 1 Eng. Rep. at 847; see a so BOWKER, supra note 223, at 26 (“This construction by the 
Lords, in the case of Donaldson v. Becket, of the Statute of Anne, has practically ‘laid down the law’ for 
England and America ever since.”). 
275 See Chartrand, supra note 69, at 221 (explaining the guild previously had recognized the moral 
rights of authors and Dona dson “effectively eliminated [moral rights] from the Anglo-American 
copyright tradition.”). 
276 See id. at 220 (asserting “[i]t is this decision that established the basic concept of Anglo-
American copyright”). 
277 See COBBETT’S PARL. HIST., supra note 69, at 999 (Lord Camden) (“Why did we enter into society 
at all, but to enlighten on another’s minds, and improve our faculties for the common welfare of the 
species?”).  The same three sets of interests continue to vie for attention in the copyright scheme in the 
United States today.  See Okediji, supra note 43, at 1640–41. 
278 Donaldson, 2 Bro. P.C. at 145, 1 Eng. Rep. at 847. 
279 Id. 
280  8 Ann., c. 19, s. 1.  
281 Id. at s. 2. 
282 Id. at pmbl. 
283 See Liemer, Primer, supra note 26, at 41 n.4 (noting in some civil code countries the opposite 
dynamic occurred and moral rights began via judicial opinions). 
284 By way of contrast, after the French Revolution, intellectual property law in France moved 
forward in a very different way.  See Chartrand, supra note 69, at 231–32.  By the 1830's, French judges 
began affirming artists’ moral rights; Sarrauté, supra note 227, at 478.  But see DAVID SAUNDERS, 
AUTHORSHIP AND COPYRIGHT 75–105 (1992) (suggesting the law was every bit as muddy and not 
inevitable in its course for many years on the other side of the English Channel).  The French 
legislature, however, waited until 1957 to codify these rights.  See DAVIES, supra note 110, at 150–55 
(outlining the legislative history in France). 
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Taking a very broad view, this history is not surprising.  It follows the general 
progression of legal history in the West, from royal decree and customary local usage, to 
Enlightenment ideals and natural law concepts, to positive law’s growth of statutory and 
regulatory law.  The fluke of history here is that moral rights ended up on the side of the 
pro-monopolistic booksellers and not on the side of the authors and the public.285  In 
Donaldson, just as in Millar, two booksellers squared off in court.  And again, arguments 
on one side had the statute to rely on, a statue without moral rights provisions, while 
arguments favoring booksellers’ perpetual monopolies could rely on just about everything 
else, including early moral rights concepts.  Of course the irony is that moral rights 
provide important protections for both authors286 and the public287 (protections that could 
prove helpful still in disputes with our modern-day “booksellers”288), yet did not end up 
on the side of the case aligned with the interests of authors and the public.  On the other 
side of the Atlantic, despite the delay caused by the American Revolution,289 Donaldson’s 
strict statutory interpretation and its lack of moral rights considerations took hold in the 
United States.290
B.  The New United States 
There were many influences, both practical and philosophical, on copyright law in 
the nascent United States,291 and a thorough discussion of them lies beyond the scope of 
this article.  In brief, statutory copyright law, including the Statute of Anne, was known 
in the American colonies292 and in the early states.293  Most of the early state statutes 
were permutations of the Statute of Anne, with two or three dominant strains.294  In 
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285 See Chartrand, supra note 69, at 221 (stating guild-recognized moral rights were eliminated 
along with common law copyright).   
286 See Richard Serra, Suppression and Liberty: The Tilted Arc Controversy, 19 CARDOZO ARTS & 
ENT. L.J. 39, 39–46 (2001) (explaining how lack of legal protection before VARA resulted in forced 
dismantling of his federally commissioned sculpture); Grace Glueck, Bank Cuts up a Noguchi Sculpture 
and Stores It, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 1980, at A1 (reporting no protection for integrity of a sculpture, a 
decade before VARA); Diane Rose, Calde ’s “Pittsburgh:” A Violated and Immobile Mobile, ARTNEWS, 
Jan. 1978, at 39 (reporting county airport officials relocated mobile sculpture, made it immobile, and 
repainted it, to prevent drivers from rubbernecking). 
287 See Merryman, Public Inte est, supra note 112, at 363. 
288 See infra p. 36. 
289 See Chartrand, supra note 69, at 223 (indicating there was a lack of trade in law books during 
the Revolutionary War). 
290 See infra p. 34.  Perhaps it is because of the delay, however, that the concept of a common law 
copyright, potentially applicable to matters not covered by statute, remains in play in the United States 
to this day.  See infra note 324.   
291 See, e.g., Chartrand, supra note 69, at 223–29 (examining competing influences on the new 
nation’s copyright law); Shirata, supra note 88, at 199–203 (describing the mixing—and mixing up—of 
natural rights law, common law, and regulatory control). 
292 See Shirata, supra note 88. at 196 (reporting a Massachusetts law in 1672 that concerned 
copyright and then no other indigenous statutes until 1780).  
293 See DAVIES, supra note 110, at 76–77 n.1 (listing and describing the state statutes); Shirata, 
supra note 88, at 196–202 (including a chart of the title and date of each state’s legislation); Fred Fisher 
Music Co. v. M.Witmark & Sons, 318 U.S. 643, 649–51 (1943) (reviewing the state statutes). 
294 See Shirata, supra note 88, at 200 (mapping the level of influence of the Statute of Anne in the 
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addition, the Framers knew the history of the Stationers Company’s monopoly and the 
Millar and Donaldson precedents.295
Drafting the Constitution, authority for a federal statute was accounted for in the 
Copyright Clause: “Congress shall have the Power . . . To promote the Progress of Science 
. . . by securing for limited Times to Authors . . . the exclusive Right to 
their . . Writings . . . .”296  Exercising this power, Congress enacted297 the first United 
States copyright statute in 1790.298  Its ancestry in to the Statute of Anne was obvious.299 
 Its title started by stating it was an “Act for the Encouragement of Learning,”300 just as 
the Statute of Anne’s title did.301  The 1790 statute’s title explained the method for 
encouraging this learning: “by securing the copies of maps, charts, and books, to the 
authors and proprietors of such copies . . . .”302  The Statute of Anne’s method had been 
“by Vesting the Copies of Printed Books in the Authors or Purchasers of such Copies.”303
The differences in the new statute were obvious, too, even in the wording of the title. 
 More types of works were covered, with the inclusion of maps and charts.304  Instead of 
“Authors or Purchasers,”305 the 1790 statute’s title refers to “authors and proprietors,”306 
and then “authors,” “proprietors,” and “persons . . . who hath legally acquired the 
copyright” appear in the text itself.307  This shift in language reflects the fact that the 
1790 statute did not have to wrestle monopolistic control away from a long-standing 
guild.  The historical context of the Statute of Anne had forced Parliament to emphasize 
the interests of authors and the reading public.308  The new United States, however, was 
not worried about putting too much market power in the hands of “proprietors.”  Indeed, 
its leaders were anxious to build indigenous industries and an economic 
infrastructure.309
The public’s interest was certainly an important part of United States copyright law 
from its beginning.  The goal, however, was not learning to just generally enlighten the 
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thirteen states); Fisher, 318 U.S. at 648 (“In this country the copyright laws enacted by the original 
thirteen states prior to 1789 were based largely upon the Statute of Anne.”). 
295 See Chartrand, supra note 69, at 223–30; VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 64, at 44 (stating James 
Madison and Noah Webster were “mindful” of copyright history when working on copyright law). 
296 U.S. CONST. art I., § 8, cl. 8; ee a o BOWKER, supra note 223, at 7 (stating the constitutional 
grant to Congress followed England’s post-Donaldson approach to copyright).  
297 See H.R. Bill 43, 1st Cong., 2d Sess. (1790); ee also THORVALD SOLBERG, COPYRIGHT IN 
CONGRESS 1789–1904, Copyright Office Bulletin No. 8, 29, 114–23 (1905) (listing the precursor bills and 
petitions to Congress, committee charges, committee reports, etc.). 
298 Act for the Encouragement of Learning, Act of May 31, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (1790). 
299 See, e.g., Fisher, 318 U.S. at 650 (“As might have been expected, this Act reflected its historical 
antecedents.”); BOWKER, supra note 223, at 24 (referring to the Statute of Anne as “the foundation of the 
present copyright system of . . . America”).   
300 1 Stat. 124, title. 
301 8 Ann., c. 19, title.  
302 1 Stat. 124, title. 
303 8 Ann., c. 19, title. 
304 1 Stat. 124, title. 
305 8 Ann., c. 19, title. 
306 1 Stat. 124, title. 
307 Id. at s. 1.  
308 See supra p. 9–11. 
309 See DAVIES, supra note 110, at 28 (stating the underlying philosophy was that “encouragement 
of individual effort by personal gain [was] the best way to advance public welfare”). 
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mind (except for in political matters)310 or to create art for art’s sake.  The leaders of the 
day understood the need to build a national identity, to encourage a unique American 
culture—culture in the broad sense of the term, that is, not necessarily culture in any 
elevating sense.  And so intellectual property that supported industry was the focus. 
Nonetheless, the first Congress worked within practical legal concepts with which it 
was familiar.  The Copyright Act of 1790 granted a fourteen-year monopoly,311 and 
allowed a renewal for a second fourteen years,312 just as the Statute of Anne had.  Even 
without a local history that included the Stationers Company, the old guild’s 
requirement of recording the copyright in a register313 and depositing a copy of the 
work314 remained. 
Perhaps even more important than the outlines of the Statute of Anne that survived 
eighty years, an Atlantic crossing, and the Revolutionary War, is the fact that the case 
law interpreting it survived, too.  Despite the provision for copyright in the Constitution, 
copyright law quickly became a matter of statutory analysis,315 following in the footsteps 
of Donaldson,316 rather than an area for constitutional analysis.317  The first copyright 
case decided by the United States Supreme Court, Wheaton v. Peters,318 set the tone, by 
relying on statutory interpretation.319  For those matters not covered by the new statute 
but already covered by the common law, particularly for pre-publication copyright issues, 
cases in the United States continued to refer to Donaldson to find a common law 
copyright.320  With the focus on statutory interpretation, and no mention of moral rights 
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310 President George Washington, Speech of the President of the Uni ed Sta es to both Houses of 
Congress, 1st Cong., 2d Sess. (Jan. 8, 1790), reprinted in SOLBERG, supra note 297, at 115–16 
(advocating the “promotion of science and literature” to teach “the people themselves to know and to 
value their own rights”). 
311 1 Stat. 124, s. 1. 
312 Id. 
313 Id. at s. 3.  The federal District Court clerk was assigned the recording task at first.  Id.  Now the 
task falls to the Copyright Office in the Library of Congress.  17 U.S.C. § 408(a) (2000).  
314 1 Stat. 124, s. 4.  The depository was originally in the Secretary of State’s office, id., and now it is 
in the Copyright Office of the Library of Congress.  17 U.S.C. § 407(b) (2000). 
315 See Hamilton, Deference, supra note 13, at 323–25. 
316 See Shirata, supra note 88, at 203 (stating that the United States Supreme Court’s first 
copyright case “was along the lines of traditional English theory established in Donaldson”). 
317 See Hamilton, Deference, supra note 13, at 321 (tallying sixty-one United States Supreme Court 
copyright cases interpreting the statute and only five interpreting the Copyright Clause).  
318 Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 667–68 (1834). 
319 See Shirata, supra note 88, at 203 (explaining howWheaton “adopted a strict literal construction 
of the statute”); Chartrand, supra note 69, at 226 (concluding “the Court also rejected what later became 
known as the ‘moral’ rights of authors”); ee al o Am. Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister, 207 U.S. 284, 291 
(1907) (“In this country it is well settled that property in copyright is the creation of the federal statute 
passed in the exercise of the power vested in Congress” by the Copyright Clause.).  
320 Even in the recent, major case of Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003), the parties argued a 
fine point about common law copyright, but the Court declined to jump into that fray.  Id. at 196 n.3.  
Other federal and state cases through two centuries have cited Donaldson as authority on the existence 
of a pre-publication common law copyright.  See, e.g., Crowe v. Aiken, 6 F. Cas. 904, 905–06 (N.D. Ill. 
1870) (citing both Millar and Donaldson to find a pre-publication common law copyright); Capitol 
Records, Inc. v. Naxos of Am., Inc., 830 N.E.2d 250, 255 (N.Y. 2005) (finding common law copyright 
protection for musical recordings, extending since the time of Donaldson); see also 17 U.S.C. § 301(b) 
(2000) (stating the federal copyright statute does not limit any existing common law rights for matters 
not covered by the statute). 
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in the statute until 1991, moral rights simply did not develop in the United States.   
Very little of the Engravers’ Act crossed the Atlantic or had much impact on United 
States copyright law.321  In the United Kingdom, protection for engravers and a 
gradually expanding list of visual artists was not merged into the main copyright statute 
until 1842,322 too late to directly influence the United States law.  Engravings did receive 
copyright protection in the United States starting in 1802,323 mostly by amending the 
1790 statute to cover engravings.324  The 1802 amending statute borrows the Engravers’ 
Act’s prohibition against copying “in the whole or in part, by varying, adding to, [or] 
diminishing from the main design,”325 but it lacks the bold preamble of the Engravers’ 
Act, with its clear concern for the artists’ creative interests.326  The early intellectual 
property law in the United States did not develop protection for these creative 
interests.327  The focus remained on the Statute of Anne and the 1790 statute.  
Conditions favored the continual development of copyright’s economic protection,328 while 
the moral rights evolutionary branch did not emerge in the United States for another 200 
years. 
IV.  CONCLUSION: EVOLUTION CONTINUES 
Until VARA, the strong economic focus of United States copyright law allowed for 
little legal recognition of other values.329  Over the years, in a smattering of cases here 
and there, judges have recognized that there are other values inherent in intellectual 
property and worthy of protection, even when they had no statutory or case precedent 
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321 I could not find a single case in the United States that referred to the Engravers’ Act, and I had 
to contact the Library of Congress to obtain a copy of the statute’s text.  By way of contrast, more than 
1,000 federal and state cases refer to the Statute of Anne, and its text is easily available.  See DAVIES, 
supra note 110, at App. 1, 371–76; DEAZLEY, supra note 68, at App. 1, 233–38; RANSOM, supra note 70, at 
109–17; http://www.copyrighthistory.com/anne.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2005). 
322  Copyright Act, 1842, 5 & 6 Vict., c. 45 (Eng.). 
323 Act of April 29, 1802, ch. 36, 6 Stat. 171 (1802); see a so VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 64, at 45. 
324 6 Stat. 171. 
325 Id.  
326  8 Geo. 2, c. 13, pmbl.  
327 See, e.g, 143 Kilty’s English Statutes 122 (1811) (listing 8 Geo. 2, c. 13, among the English 
statutes not applicable in Maryland).   
328 See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349–50 (1991) (limiting authors’ 
protection in favor of “progress of . . . useful arts”) (citation omitted); Kwall, “Author-Stories,” supra note 
13, at 20 (“[T]he United States’ capitalist culture and its classical utilitarian tradition also contributed to 
the development of a copyright doctrine more concerned with commodification  than the creation 
process.”); Suhl, supra note 43, at 1214–15 (describing the commodification of intellectual property in the 
United States and the law’s market-dominated culture); VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 64, at 20  
(asserting copyright has evolved “into one part of a matrix of commercial legal protections”).  The 
economic focus has been so pervasive, a system similar to negotiable instruments has even been 
recommended to protect creative works.  See Julie Levy, Creative Works as Negotiable Instruments: A 
Compromise Betwe n Mo al Rights Pro e tion and the Need for Transferability in the United States, 5 
VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 27, 30 (2003). 
329 See Swack, supra note 64, at 362 (reporting that “in the United States, the artist or copyright 
owner is granted . . . ‘economically exploitable rights,’ meant both to ‘encourage artists to create’ and to 
‘enrich society at the least cost to consumers.’”).  
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authority on which to rely.330  For the most part, however, values protected by moral 
rights have been foreclosed from recognition.331  The door was closed so tightly for so 
long, that even after limited moral rights were on the books,332 a federal court could 
partially excuse a municipality’s ignorance of those rights and total destruction of a 
protected work of art.333
Of course, those who do not know history are doomed to repeat it.334  So it is 
particularly important for jurists and legislators to understand this history now, as 
conditions and issues parallel to those in the eighteenth century confront our intellectual 
property law.  Once again, new technology allows copying and distributing with an ease 
and at a pace previously unimaginable.335  Once again the law is struggling to catch up to 
the new technology, as those who create works and those who distribute the works vie for 
economic benefits, while the public’s interest remains the third party in the debates.  
And once again, those who create works seek protection for their personal interest in 
their work and the creative process.  In England, it took a couple of hundred years for the 
necessary legal concepts to develop and mature into settled law that could account for 
the new technology of printing, and in that historical process cut the important values 
were lost, values protected by moral rights. 
In our internet age, given the accelerated rate of technological change,336 the 
                                                                                                                                     
330 See, e.g., Clemens v. Belford, Clark & Co., 14 F. 728, 731 (N.D. Ill. 1883) (considering the 
author’s reputation when stating in dicta, “no person has the right to hold another out to the world as 
the author of literary matter which he never wrote”); Clemens v. Press Publ’g Co., 122 N.Y.S. 206, 207–
08 (N.Y. App. Term 1910) (Seabury, J., concurring) (“While an author may . . . sell his literary 
productions, yet the purchaser . . . cannot make as free a use of them as he could for the [barrel of] pork 
which he purchases.”); Granz v. Harris, 198 F.2d 585, 589 (2d Cir. 1953) (Frank, J., concurring) (“[I]t is 
an actionable wrong to hold out the artist as author of a version which substantially departs from the 
original.”); Gilliam v. ABC, Inc., 538 F.2d 14, 25 (2d Cir. 1976) (stretching Lanham Act and contract 
interpretation to cover unauthorized modification of broadcast Monty Python sketches). 
331 See, e.g., Crimi v. Rutgers Presbyterian Church, 89 N.Y.S.2d 813, 194 Misc. 570 (N.Y. Sup. 1949) 
(holding no moral rights protection for permanently walled-over fresco); Serra v. U.S. Gen. Servs.  
Admin., 664 F. Supp. 798 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), dismissed in part, 667 F. Supp. 1042 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), aff’d, 
847 F.2d 1045 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding no moral rights protection, pre-VARA, for controversial public 
sculpture, now dismantled and stored); Shostakovich v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 80 N.Y.S.2d 
575, 578–89 (N.Y. Spec. Term 1948),  aff’d, 87 N.Y.S.2d 430 (1949) (holding no moral rights protection for 
music); Choe v. Fordham Univ. Sch. of Law, 920 F. Supp. 44, 49 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), aff’d, 81 F.3d 319 (2d 
Cir. 1996) (holding no VARA protection for written work, including a law review article); Pavia v. 1120 
Ave. of the Americas Assocs., 901 F. Supp. 620, 628–29 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding no right of integrity for 
work modified before passage of VARA and still on display after passage of VARA); Kaplan v. Lily of Fr., 
No. 95-Civ-1046, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7640 (S.D.N.Y. June 4, 1996) (holding no moral rights protection 
for a photograph); Lee v. A.R.T. Co., 125 F.3d 580, 582–83 (7th Cir. 1997); Gegenhuber v. Hystopolis 
Prods., No., 92-C-1055, 1992 WL 168836, (N.D. Ill. July 13, 1992) (holding no VARA right of attribution 
for puppets, costumes, sets, or the “creation, design, and direction” of a puppet show); Flack v. Friends of 
Queen Catherine Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d 526, 535 (2001) (finding that asking someone else to finish artist’s 
sculpture did not violate right of integrity under VARA); Silberman v. Innovation Luggage, Inc., 2003 
WL 1787123, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2003) (holding no VARA protection for reproductions of a 
photograph, i.e., no VARA protection for the original image). 
332 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106A, 107, 113, 301, 411, 412, 501, 506; see supra pp. 2–4. 
333 See supra  note 8 and accompanying text. 
334 GEORGE SANTAYANA, 1 THE LIFE OF REASON: INTRODUCTION AND REASON AND COMMON SENSE 
284 (1905).   
335 See Chartrand, supra note 69, at 233 (comparing the printing press to digitization). 
336 See ALVIN TOFFLER, FUTURE SHOCK 11–14 (1970). 
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necessary legal concepts are likely to develop in a more abbreviated time frame.  Because 
internet technology encourages a global perspective, perhaps as we look forward our 
common-law jurists may gain better appreciation for moral rights protection, already 
well-developed in other countries, by taking a look back at our own law’s early 
development. 
With VARA, moral rights are once again an ingredient in the genetic mix of our 
intellectual property law’s evolution.  They should not be delegated again to an 
evolutionary branch that leads to extinction.  Moral rights law should continue to have a 
place on the main evolutionary branch, to protect important, non-economic values 
inherent in the creative process and all creative work. 
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